Newshot

What the model knows but does not say: monitoring medical LLMs through verbalized thoughts

Summary

arXiv:2611.24994v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Efforts to keep clinical language models safe have concentrated on what enters and leaves the model, but a manipulated model can return an answer that looks entirely ordinary. Here we show that the model's own internal state, rendered in plain language, exposes manipulations the output conceals. Using a natural-language autoencoder, we translate the activations of a multimodal LLM (Gemma-3-27B) into text and let an input-blind judge read this verbalized internal state (the thoughts channel) and the model's answer separately. Across two clinical attack objectives (omitting a pathology, covertly recommending a drug), two input modalities, and two delivery mechanisms, the thoughts channel caught the injection significantly more often than the answer in all eight injected conditions (p

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Published by arXiv cs.CL
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