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Anatomy of an AI-driven attack: Bitrise security incident report

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  • It scans 20+ hostnames and labels its traffic authorized testingFrom 95.40.73.129, an AWS address in Hong Kong, the attacker sent 36,698 requests across 20+ Bitrise hostnames. This address was used for discovery and tests. It used ffuf, a tool that tries many URL paths, and user agents including pentest-probe-i5938/1.0 and Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly).The tool behind this traffic tells each of its AI agents that it is part of an authorized penetration test, which explains these labels, and is identified in the section “The tool” further down.36,698 requests20+ hostnamesOutcome: Scanning observedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing one source scanning many hostnames with authorized-testing user agents when no approved test is scheduled.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)12 lines2026-10-25T01:43:00Z 95.40.73.129 AS16509 HK GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app> 404 curl/7.88.1 Total requests for the IP (sum of count column): 36698 12813 pentest-probe-i5938/1.0 9311 curl/7.88.1 1074 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly) 819 Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.3.0 457 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) research-readonly 383 Mozilla/5.0 (research; read-only; pentest) 369 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-security-research) 180 python-requests/2.34.2 159 bitrise-pentest-probe/1.0 (authorized read-only) 76 pentest-probe-readonly/1.0 (authorized read-only baseline) These labels, the task-numbered names such as i5938 and the norma/0.4 documentation fetches point to ARTEX or software derived from it. norma/0.4 appeared 8 times from 95.40.73.129, 5 times from 118.100.234.120 and 38 times from 74.211.97.67. This identifies the tooling, not an operator, a location or a language model; the client string alone would not be enough.

It scans 20+ hostnames and labels its traffic authorized testing

From 95.40.73.129, an AWS address in Hong Kong, the attacker sent 36,698 requests across 20+ Bitrise hostnames. This address was used for discovery and tests. It used ffuf, a tool that tries many URL paths, and user agents including pentest-probe-i5938/1.0 and Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly).

The tool behind this traffic tells each of its AI agents that it is part of an authorized penetration test, which explains these labels, and is identified in the section “The tool” further down.

  • 36,698 requests
  • 20+ hostnames

Outcome: Scanning observedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing one source scanning many hostnames with authorized-testing user agents when no approved test is scheduled.


        2026-10-25T01:43:00Z  95.40.73.129 AS16509 HK  GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app>  404  curl/7.88.1
Total requests for the IP (sum of count column): 36698
12813 pentest-probe-i5938/1.0
9311 curl/7.88.1
1074 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly)
819 Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.3.0
457 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) research-readonly
383 Mozilla/5.0 (research; read-only; pentest)
369 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-security-research)
180 python-requests/2.34.2
159 bitrise-pentest-probe/1.0 (authorized read-only)
76 pentest-probe-readonly/1.0 (authorized read-only baseline)
      

These labels, the task-numbered names such as i5938 and the norma/0.4 documentation fetches point to ARTEX or software derived from it. norma/0.4 appeared 8 times from 95.40.73.129, 5 times from 118.100.234.120 and 38 times from 74.211.97.67. This identifies the tooling, not an operator, a location or a language model; the client string alone would not be enough.

  • It reads public build logs from 12 open-source appsThe same address used signed download links to read build logs from 12 public open-source apps. Cloud logs recorded 59 successful object reads. These logs were public by design.Outcome: Public logs readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisCorrelate bursts of public build-log reads in cloud audit logs with scanning from the same source.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)4 linesfirst/last/count/succeeded principal 2026-10-25T17:31:24.488 2026-10-25T17:33:29.105 59 59 <service-account> (signed URL) <bucket>, apps <app>, <app>, <app>, <app>, … Application database (repositories): all 12 app slugs have is_public = true. Storage request totals and public-app flags establish the scope, but 59 object reads do not establish a count of unique files. Project names and identifiers are omitted.

It reads public build logs from 12 open-source apps

The same address used signed download links to read build logs from 12 public open-source apps. Cloud logs recorded 59 successful object reads. These logs were public by design.

Outcome: Public logs readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisCorrelate bursts of public build-log reads in cloud audit logs with scanning from the same source.


        first/last/count/succeeded  principal
2026-10-25T17:31:24.488  2026-10-25T17:33:29.105  59  59  <service-account> (signed URL)
<bucket>, apps <app>, <app>, <app>, <app>, …
Application database (repositories): all 12 app slugs have is_public = true.
      

Storage request totals and public-app flags establish the scope, but 59 object reads do not establish a count of unique files. Project names and identifiers are omitted.

  • It creates five accounts and tests their security settingsThe attacker registered five accounts from 95.40.73.129 and tested security settings without creating workspaces, apps or builds. It created 15 one-hour personal access tokens, exercised password resets and tried to activate two-factor authentication. It also tried to delete a token belonging to someone else. That request returned HTTP 404.The usernames were pentestprobe-1d2bf9, pentestprobe-9cede9, pentestprobe-280c2cfd, pentestprobe-q7m4z2 and pentest-probe-v2-mbjlcuxr. All five confirmed sign-up addresses appear in the evidence below.Outcome: Settings partly testedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on account logs showing fresh accounts creating tokens, resetting passwords, changing two-factor settings and failing token deletions without ordinary product use.EvidenceApplication database change history11 [email protected] 2026-10-25 19:58:21 2026-10-25 19:58:34 95.40.73.129 2026-10-25 19:58:34 2026-10-25 22:20:36 [email protected] 2026-10-25 20:09:23 2026-10-25 20:09:29 95.40.73.129 2026-10-25 20:09:29 2026-10-25 22:19:28 [email protected] 2026-10-25 20:14:21 2026-10-25 20:14:31 <mail-testing service>,95.40.73.129 2026-10-25 20:14:31 2026-10-25 20:15:54 [email protected] 2026-10-25 23:00:56 2026-10-25 23:05:40 95.40.73.129 2026-10-25 23:05:40 2026-10-25 23:07:53 [email protected] 2026-10-26 08:18:25 2026-10-26 08:24:53 95.40.73.129 2026-10-26 08:24:53 2026-10-26 08:24:53 CDC user_auth_tokens: 15 one-hour tokens created by these users between 2026-10-25 20:04:37 and 2026-10-26 22:05:52. 2026-10-25T20:04Z POST app.bitrise.io /me/profile/security/create_website_user_auth_token 204 2026-10-25T21:25Z POST app.bitrise.io <password-reset endpoint> 201 2026-10-25T21:30–21:32Z PUT <password-reset endpoint> 422 x13, 204 x1 2026-10-25T21:39Z POST /me/profile/security/activate_two_factor_auth.json 422 2026-10-25T21:39Z DELETE /me/profile/security/user_auth_tokens/<token> 404 (IDOR probe) Account rows give creation, confirmation, source address and first and last sign-in. The usernames are the platform usernames, not the e-mail local parts. One sign-in at the moment of e-mail confirmation came from a mail-testing service, not from the attacker. The window includes the later token tests; endpoint paths are generalized.

It creates five accounts and tests their security settings

The attacker registered five accounts from 95.40.73.129 and tested security settings without creating workspaces, apps or builds. It created 15 one-hour personal access tokens, exercised password resets and tried to activate two-factor authentication. It also tried to delete a token belonging to someone else. That request returned HTTP 404.

The usernames were pentestprobe-1d2bf9, pentestprobe-9cede9, pentestprobe-280c2cfd, pentestprobe-q7m4z2 and pentest-probe-v2-mbjlcuxr. All five confirmed sign-up addresses appear in the evidence below.

Outcome: Settings partly testedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on account logs showing fresh accounts creating tokens, resetting passwords, changing two-factor settings and failing token deletions without ordinary product use.


        [email protected]  2026-10-25 19:58:21  2026-10-25 19:58:34  95.40.73.129  2026-10-25 19:58:34  2026-10-25 22:20:36
[email protected]  2026-10-25 20:09:23  2026-10-25 20:09:29  95.40.73.129  2026-10-25 20:09:29  2026-10-25 22:19:28
[email protected]  2026-10-25 20:14:21  2026-10-25 20:14:31  <mail-testing service>,95.40.73.129  2026-10-25 20:14:31  2026-10-25 20:15:54
[email protected]  2026-10-25 23:00:56  2026-10-25 23:05:40  95.40.73.129  2026-10-25 23:05:40  2026-10-25 23:07:53
[email protected]  2026-10-26 08:18:25  2026-10-26 08:24:53  95.40.73.129  2026-10-26 08:24:53  2026-10-26 08:24:53
CDC user_auth_tokens: 15 one-hour tokens created by these users between 2026-10-25 20:04:37 and 2026-10-26 22:05:52.
2026-10-25T20:04Z POST app.bitrise.io /me/profile/security/create_website_user_auth_token 204
2026-10-25T21:25Z POST app.bitrise.io <password-reset endpoint> 201
2026-10-25T21:30–21:32Z PUT <password-reset endpoint> 422 x13, 204 x1
2026-10-25T21:39Z POST /me/profile/security/activate_two_factor_auth.json 422
2026-10-25T21:39Z DELETE /me/profile/security/user_auth_tokens/<token> 404 (IDOR probe)
      

Account rows give creation, confirmation, source address and first and last sign-in. The usernames are the platform usernames, not the e-mail local parts. One sign-in at the moment of e-mail confirmation came from a mail-testing service, not from the attacker. The window includes the later token tests; endpoint paths are generalized.

  • It reads files through public links; bucket listings are deniedThe attacker opened public install-page links for 70 different apps. These pages are public by design and need no sign-in. Adding .json to a page link returns a signed download URL. Cloud logs recorded 59 successful object reads across three private customer apps. Three more apps returned only missing-object results. One of the three was a customer’s penetration-testing build, described in the next step.These reads were not unauthorized access. How the attacker collected the links is not established. Separately, all 13 anonymous attempts to list the storage bucket were denied.70 apps with opened links59 successful object reads13 bucket listings deniedOutcome: Reads partly succeededEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)11 lines2026-10-25T20:23Z GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app>/installable-artifacts/<artifact>/public-install-page/<hash> 200 GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), bucket <bucket>: first last n status app 2026-10-25T20:26:01.786 2026-10-26T12:36:18.045 26 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-25T20:26:16.618 2026-10-26T12:36:27.705 19 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-25T20:26:22.502 2026-10-26T12:36:32.081 14 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-25T20:26:12.163 2026-10-26T12:35:43.155 9 NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-25T20:26:14.773 2026-10-26T12:35:45.772 9 NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-26T12:33:16.119 2026-10-26T12:35:49.702 4 NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-10-26T08:53:54 → 12:02:23 13 anonymous bucket listings — all DENIED (code 7) Cloudflare: distinct app slugs in public-install-page URLs requested by 95.40.73.129 = 70 The 59 reads are operations, not unique files, and each generalized app row represents a different app. Three apps had successful reads, not six; NOT_FOUND means a missing object, not expiration.

It reads files through public links; bucket listings are denied

The attacker opened public install-page links for 70 different apps. These pages are public by design and need no sign-in. Adding .json to a page link returns a signed download URL. Cloud logs recorded 59 successful object reads across three private customer apps. Three more apps returned only missing-object results. One of the three was a customer’s penetration-testing build, described in the next step.

These reads were not unauthorized access. How the attacker collected the links is not established. Separately, all 13 anonymous attempts to list the storage bucket were denied.

  • 70 apps with opened links
  • 59 successful object reads
  • 13 bucket listings denied

Outcome: Reads partly succeededEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        2026-10-25T20:23Z GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app>/installable-artifacts/<artifact>/public-install-page/<hash> 200
GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), bucket <bucket>:
first                    last                     n  status  app
2026-10-25T20:26:01.786  2026-10-26T12:36:18.045  26  OK  apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-25T20:26:16.618  2026-10-26T12:36:27.705  19  OK  apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-25T20:26:22.502  2026-10-26T12:36:32.081  14  OK  apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-25T20:26:12.163  2026-10-26T12:35:43.155  9  NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-25T20:26:14.773  2026-10-26T12:35:45.772  9  NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-26T12:33:16.119  2026-10-26T12:35:49.702  4  NOT_FOUND apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-10-26T08:53:54 → 12:02:23  13 anonymous bucket listings — all DENIED (code 7)
Cloudflare: distinct app slugs in public-install-page URLs requested by 95.40.73.129 = 70
      

The 59 reads are operations, not unique files, and each generalized app row represents a different app. Three apps had successful reads, not six; NOT_FOUND means a missing object, not expiration.

  • It downloads a customer’s penetration-testing build: a decoyOne of the public install links belonged to an app build that a customer publishes for its own penetration testing. The attacker opened that page on Oct 25 at 20:23 UTC. By 12:36 UTC the next day, cloud storage had recorded 26 successful reads of that app’s files.On Nov 12 it came back to the same app from 118.100.234.120. In 32 seconds it made five successful reads; one requested about 96 MB of the iOS app file. A sixth request, sent without the signed link, was denied.The customer had made this link public, so these downloads were not unauthorized access, and we do not name the customer. We treat the download as a decoy. Fetching a real pentest build ties a hostile scan to activity that looks like legitimate testing. The logs record the downloads; they cannot record the motive.26 successful reads, Oct 25–265 successful reads, Nov 121 request denied without the linkOutcome: Public build downloadedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on public install links fetched by command-line clients or scanners, and on the same link fetched again from a different network weeks later.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)10 lines2026-10-25T20:23Z GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app>/installable-artifacts/<artifact>/public-install-page/<hash> 200 GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), callerIp 95.40.73.129: 2026-10-25T20:26:01.786 2026-10-26T12:36:18.045 26 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) GCP storage.objects.get, callerIp 118.100.234.120, user agent curl/7.88.1: 2026-11-12T16:21:36.296Z OK apps/<app>/builds/<build>/artifacts/<artifact>/<android package> 2026-11-12T16:21:36.642Z OK apps/<app>/builds/<build>/artifacts/<artifact>/<ios app file> 2026-11-12T16:21:51.433Z OK …/<android package> 2026-11-12T16:21:52.103Z OK …/<ios app file> 2026-11-12T16:22:08.018Z OK …/<ios app file> requested_bytes ≈ 96 MB 2026-11-12T16:22:26.385Z DENIED …/<ios app file> anonymous caller, no signed link (code 7) The October and November rows concern the same app, and the install page opened in October belongs to the iOS file requested on Nov 12. The build record identifies it as the customer’s penetration-testing build. The customer, app and file names are withheld and the byte count is rounded. A requested byte count shows what was asked for, not that the transfer completed; the two reads of the Android package record none. That the download served as a decoy is our assessment.

It downloads a customer’s penetration-testing build: a decoy

One of the public install links belonged to an app build that a customer publishes for its own penetration testing. The attacker opened that page on Oct 25 at 20:23 UTC. By 12:36 UTC the next day, cloud storage had recorded 26 successful reads of that app’s files.

On Nov 12 it came back to the same app from 118.100.234.120. In 32 seconds it made five successful reads; one requested about 96 MB of the iOS app file. A sixth request, sent without the signed link, was denied.

The customer had made this link public, so these downloads were not unauthorized access, and we do not name the customer. We treat the download as a decoy. Fetching a real pentest build ties a hostile scan to activity that looks like legitimate testing. The logs record the downloads; they cannot record the motive.

  • 26 successful reads, Oct 25–26
  • 5 successful reads, Nov 12
  • 1 request denied without the link

Outcome: Public build downloadedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on public install links fetched by command-line clients or scanners, and on the same link fetched again from a different network weeks later.


        2026-10-25T20:23Z GET app.bitrise.io /app/<app>/installable-artifacts/<artifact>/public-install-page/<hash> 200
GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), callerIp 95.40.73.129:
2026-10-25T20:26:01.786  2026-10-26T12:36:18.045  26  OK  apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
GCP storage.objects.get, callerIp 118.100.234.120, user agent curl/7.88.1:
2026-11-12T16:21:36.296Z  OK      apps/<app>/builds/<build>/artifacts/<artifact>/<android package>
2026-11-12T16:21:36.642Z  OK      apps/<app>/builds/<build>/artifacts/<artifact>/<ios app file>
2026-11-12T16:21:51.433Z  OK      …/<android package>
2026-11-12T16:21:52.103Z  OK      …/<ios app file>
2026-11-12T16:22:08.018Z  OK      …/<ios app file>  requested_bytes ≈ 96 MB
2026-11-12T16:22:26.385Z  DENIED  …/<ios app file>  anonymous caller, no signed link (code 7)
      

The October and November rows concern the same app, and the install page opened in October belongs to the iOS file requested on Nov 12. The build record identifies it as the customer’s penetration-testing build. The customer, app and file names are withheld and the byte count is rounded. A requested byte count shows what was asked for, not that the transfer completed; the two reads of the Android package record none. That the download served as a decoy is our assessment.

  • It makes a Bitrise service fetch a URL of its choosingThe attacker made our code-signing identity lookup service fetch a URL it chose. This confirmed server-side request forgery (SSRF): making a server fetch an attacker-chosen URL. At 21:33 UTC, our edge received /_i6084_probe_missing from our own egress address, using Go-http-client/2.0. The attacker had been probing the service from 95.40.73.129.Service egress metrics also recorded requests to internal-only service names on Oct 25–26. These establish internal requests, not what their response bodies contained. The i6084 canary path followed the task-numbered naming pattern in the scanning user agents.Outcome: Server fetch confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on egress metrics showing URL-fetching workloads contacting internal destinations and edge logs showing probe paths requested from your own egress addresses.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)6 lines2026-10-25T21:33:00Z <our own egress address> GET <internal-host> /_i6084_probe_missing 404 Go-http-client/2.0 (x3) 95.40.73.129 → <internal-host>: 8115 requests, 2026-10-25T19:38Z – 2026-10-26T22:55Z 2026-10-25T20:00 egress_<internal-host> 301 x1 2026-10-25T20:00 egress_<internal-host> 301 x1 2026-10-26T08:00 egress_<internal-host> 503 x3 2026-10-26T08:00 egress_<internal-host>:9000 503 x1 The first line is the edge canary; the last four are hourly service-egress metrics. Distinct internal destinations are generalized, and Bitrise’s egress address is not an attacker indicator.

It makes a Bitrise service fetch a URL of its choosing

The attacker made our code-signing identity lookup service fetch a URL it chose. This confirmed server-side request forgery (SSRF): making a server fetch an attacker-chosen URL. At 21:33 UTC, our edge received /_i6084_probe_missing from our own egress address, using Go-http-client/2.0. The attacker had been probing the service from 95.40.73.129.

Service egress metrics also recorded requests to internal-only service names on Oct 25–26. These establish internal requests, not what their response bodies contained. The i6084 canary path followed the task-numbered naming pattern in the scanning user agents.

Outcome: Server fetch confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on egress metrics showing URL-fetching workloads contacting internal destinations and edge logs showing probe paths requested from your own egress addresses.


        2026-10-25T21:33:00Z <our own egress address> GET <internal-host> /_i6084_probe_missing 404 Go-http-client/2.0 (x3)
95.40.73.129 → <internal-host>: 8115 requests, 2026-10-25T19:38Z – 2026-10-26T22:55Z
2026-10-25T20:00 egress_<internal-host> 301 x1
2026-10-25T20:00 egress_<internal-host> 301 x1
2026-10-26T08:00 egress_<internal-host> 503 x3
2026-10-26T08:00 egress_<internal-host>:9000 503 x1
      

The first line is the edge canary; the last four are hourly service-egress metrics. Distinct internal destinations are generalized, and Bitrise’s egress address is not an attacker indicator.

  • It tries common exploit paths; every request returns 404The attacker sent a short burst of POST requests to common exploit and administration paths for Axis2, Webmin, Artifactory, Drupal and Redfish. Every recorded request in this burst returned HTTP 404: the requested route was not found.Outcome: Requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisFlag request logs showing bursts of unrelated product-login and exploit paths from a source also scanning services or testing accounts.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)5 lines2026-10-26T14:07Z POST app.bitrise.io /axis2-admin/login 404 2026-10-26T14:09Z POST <internal-host> /session_login.cgi 404 2026-10-26T14:11Z POST app.bitrise.io /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax 404 2026-10-26T14:12Z POST <internal-host> /artifactory/ui/auth/login 404 2026-10-26T14:15Z POST app.bitrise.io /redfish/v1/SessionService/Sessions/ 404 Selected POST requests from 95.40.73.129. These results describe this burst, not every service or route.

It tries common exploit paths; every request returns 404

The attacker sent a short burst of POST requests to common exploit and administration paths for Axis2, Webmin, Artifactory, Drupal and Redfish. Every recorded request in this burst returned HTTP 404: the requested route was not found.

Outcome: Requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisFlag request logs showing bursts of unrelated product-login and exploit paths from a source also scanning services or testing accounts.


        2026-10-26T14:07Z POST app.bitrise.io /axis2-admin/login 404
2026-10-26T14:09Z POST <internal-host> /session_login.cgi 404
2026-10-26T14:11Z POST app.bitrise.io /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax 404
2026-10-26T14:12Z POST <internal-host> /artifactory/ui/auth/login 404
2026-10-26T14:15Z POST app.bitrise.io /redfish/v1/SessionService/Sessions/ 404
      

Selected POST requests from 95.40.73.129. These results describe this burst, not every service or route.

  • A German server creates accounts with no follow-on activityFrom 185.197.251.16, a Contabo address in Germany, two probe-named accounts were created and confirmed between 19:01 and 19:10 UTC. Nine more pqp<digits> accounts followed between 20:05 and 21:09 UTC. None of the nine confirmed its email or signed in.This address is assessed as noise generation only, with no follow-on activity from it. The link to the attacker is inferred from naming, not a shared authenticated session. The nine never-confirmed email addresses are not published because nothing shows the attacker controlled those mailboxes.Outcome: Sign-ups observedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisCorrelate account logs showing probe-named sign-ups and high nonconfirmation rates with other incident indicators rather than disposable-mail domains alone.EvidenceApplication database change history11 [email protected] pqprobe386873 created 2026-10-30 19:01:33 ip 185.197.251.16 [email protected] probe387344 created 2026-10-30 19:09:47 ip 185.197.251.16 pqp390718 Oct 30 20:05 <email omitted> 0 pqp391294 Oct 30 20:15 <email omitted> 0 pqp391428 Oct 30 20:17 <email omitted> 0 pqp391973 Oct 30 20:26 <email omitted> 0 pqp394149 Oct 30 21:02 <email omitted> 0 pqp394257 Oct 30 21:04 <email omitted> 0 pqp394365 Oct 30 21:06 <email omitted> 0 pqp394473 Oct 30 21:08 <email omitted> 0 pqp394581 Oct 30 21:09 <email omitted> 0 The last column in the nine later rows is recorded sign-ins; the last sign-up is available only to the minute. The noise-only reading is the investigation's assessment, not a logged fact; disposable-mail domains alone do not establish the link.

A German server creates accounts with no follow-on activity

From 185.197.251.16, a Contabo address in Germany, two probe-named accounts were created and confirmed between 19:01 and 19:10 UTC. Nine more pqp<digits> accounts followed between 20:05 and 21:09 UTC. None of the nine confirmed its email or signed in.

This address is assessed as noise generation only, with no follow-on activity from it. The link to the attacker is inferred from naming, not a shared authenticated session. The nine never-confirmed email addresses are not published because nothing shows the attacker controlled those mailboxes.

Outcome: Sign-ups observedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisCorrelate account logs showing probe-named sign-ups and high nonconfirmation rates with other incident indicators rather than disposable-mail domains alone.


        [email protected] pqprobe386873 created 2026-10-30 19:01:33 ip 185.197.251.16
[email protected] probe387344 created 2026-10-30 19:09:47 ip 185.197.251.16
pqp390718 Oct 30 20:05 <email omitted> 0
pqp391294 Oct 30 20:15 <email omitted> 0
pqp391428 Oct 30 20:17 <email omitted> 0
pqp391973 Oct 30 20:26 <email omitted> 0
pqp394149 Oct 30 21:02 <email omitted> 0
pqp394257 Oct 30 21:04 <email omitted> 0
pqp394365 Oct 30 21:06 <email omitted> 0
pqp394473 Oct 30 21:08 <email omitted> 0
pqp394581 Oct 30 21:09 <email omitted> 0
      

The last column in the nine later rows is recorded sign-ins; the last sign-up is available only to the minute. The noise-only reading is the investigation's assessment, not a logged fact; disposable-mail domains alone do not establish the link.

  • A possibly related address creates seven accounts that stay unusedA China Telecom address, 60.173.247.xxx, created seven accounts in about 32 seconds. Six usernames followed the probe<digits> pattern. None of the seven accounts ever signed in.This burst is possibly related, with low confidence. The only links are the probe-style usernames and timing between the October and November activity. We withhold the first username because it reads like a personal name, and the email addresses because nothing shows the attacker controlled those mailboxes.Outcome: Sign-ups observedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisFlag account logs showing rapid sign-up bursts with probe-style names, but require additional evidence before linking them to an existing attacker.EvidenceApplication database change history7 lines<username omitted> Nov 4 06:35:49 <email domain omitted> 0 probe3196914374 Nov 4 06:36:07 <email domain omitted> 0 probe2229013017 Nov 4 06:36:08 <email domain omitted> 0 probe2640930265 Nov 4 06:36:11 <email domain omitted> 0 probe1140114712 Nov 4 06:36:14 <email domain omitted> 0 probe1114832364 Nov 4 06:36:18 <email domain omitted> 0 probe2618023238 Nov 4 06:36:21 <email domain omitted> 0 All rows are sign-ups from 60.173.247.xxx, and the last column is recorded sign-ins; no shared session or credential ties them to the attacker. The network is China Telecom, AS4134, Anhui, China, which does not identify the operator.

A possibly related address creates seven accounts that stay unused

A China Telecom address, 60.173.247.xxx, created seven accounts in about 32 seconds. Six usernames followed the probe<digits> pattern. None of the seven accounts ever signed in.

This burst is possibly related, with low confidence. The only links are the probe-style usernames and timing between the October and November activity. We withhold the first username because it reads like a personal name, and the email addresses because nothing shows the attacker controlled those mailboxes.

Outcome: Sign-ups observedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisFlag account logs showing rapid sign-up bursts with probe-style names, but require additional evidence before linking them to an existing attacker.


        <username omitted> Nov 4 06:35:49 <email domain omitted> 0
probe3196914374 Nov 4 06:36:07 <email domain omitted> 0
probe2229013017 Nov 4 06:36:08 <email domain omitted> 0
probe2640930265 Nov 4 06:36:11 <email domain omitted> 0
probe1140114712 Nov 4 06:36:14 <email domain omitted> 0
probe1114832364 Nov 4 06:36:18 <email domain omitted> 0
probe2618023238 Nov 4 06:36:21 <email domain omitted> 0
      

All rows are sign-ups from 60.173.247.xxx, and the last column is recorded sign-ins; no shared session or credential ties them to the attacker. The network is China Telecom, AS4134, Anhui, China, which does not identify the operator.

  • It returns from Kuala Lumpur and sends 48,084 requestsFrom 118.100.234.120, a TM Technology Services subscriber-type address in Kuala Lumpur, the attacker made five requests on Nov 10 and 116 on Nov 11. The earliest browser session reported a UTC+8 (China Standard Time) setting. A browser setting is not a location.From 12:52 to 19:08 UTC on Nov 12, the address sent 48,084 requests in about six hours. One API host received 35,346, mostly using ffuf. The attacker also tried the made-up hostname label zzq-random-nonexist-9182 to test how wildcard DNS and routing handled a name with no deployed service.48,084 Nov 12 requests35,346 requests to one API hostOutcome: Scanning observedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing rapidly rising per-source volume and Host or SNI labels matching no deployed service, especially alongside ffuf traffic.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)4 lines118.100.234.120 2026-11-10 10:30–10:30 5 req bitrise.io 118.100.234.120 2026-11-11 14:38–14:48 116 req bitrise.io 118.100.234.120 2026-11-12 12:52–19:08 48084 req (top) <internal-host> 35346, api 2381, <internal-host> 1726, <internal-host> 1181, <internal-host> 776 (ffuf 481) WHOIS: TM TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN. BHD., Kuala Lumpur, MY (AS4788) The browser time-zone setting is a reported observation, not established by this request-count excerpt. The made-up hostname label is from the responders' record; internal hostname suffixes are omitted.

It returns from Kuala Lumpur and sends 48,084 requests

From 118.100.234.120, a TM Technology Services subscriber-type address in Kuala Lumpur, the attacker made five requests on Nov 10 and 116 on Nov 11. The earliest browser session reported a UTC+8 (China Standard Time) setting. A browser setting is not a location.

From 12:52 to 19:08 UTC on Nov 12, the address sent 48,084 requests in about six hours. One API host received 35,346, mostly using ffuf. The attacker also tried the made-up hostname label zzq-random-nonexist-9182 to test how wildcard DNS and routing handled a name with no deployed service.

  • 48,084 Nov 12 requests
  • 35,346 requests to one API host

Outcome: Scanning observedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing rapidly rising per-source volume and Host or SNI labels matching no deployed service, especially alongside ffuf traffic.


        118.100.234.120 2026-11-10 10:30–10:30 5 req bitrise.io
118.100.234.120 2026-11-11 14:38–14:48 116 req bitrise.io
118.100.234.120 2026-11-12 12:52–19:08 48084 req (top) <internal-host> 35346, api 2381, <internal-host> 1726, <internal-host> 1181, <internal-host> 776 (ffuf 481)
WHOIS: TM TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN. BHD., Kuala Lumpur, MY (AS4788)
      

The browser time-zone setting is a reported observation, not established by this request-count excerpt. The made-up hostname label is from the responders' record; internal hostname suffixes are omitted.

  • It reaches cloud metadata; the response contents remain unknownThe URL-fetching service received three HTTP 200 responses from 169.254.169.254, the cloud metadata address, while the attacker probed it. These appeared in the 14:00–15:00 UTC hourly metric bucket. SSRF reached that destination, but the metric contains neither the request path nor the response body.Whether anything sensitive came back is not established. HTTP 200 alone does not prove a token was returned. We took the service offline on Nov 14.Outcome: Contents unknownEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisMonitor service egress metrics for cloud metadata addresses and retain request paths and response context to distinguish successful requests from token theft.EvidenceCloud monitoring metrics2 lines2026-11-12T14:00 egress_169.254.169.254 200 x3 Cloudflare: 118.100.234.120 → <internal-host> 776 req 2026-11-12T13:39Z–17:08Z (481 via ffuf) The timestamp marks an hourly bucket, not an individual request. The service-offline action is from the responders' record; the metadata response contents remain unknown.

It reaches cloud metadata; the response contents remain unknown

The URL-fetching service received three HTTP 200 responses from 169.254.169.254, the cloud metadata address, while the attacker probed it. These appeared in the 14:00–15:00 UTC hourly metric bucket. SSRF reached that destination, but the metric contains neither the request path nor the response body.

Whether anything sensitive came back is not established. HTTP 200 alone does not prove a token was returned. We took the service offline on Nov 14.

Outcome: Contents unknownEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisMonitor service egress metrics for cloud metadata addresses and retain request paths and response context to distinguish successful requests from token theft.


        2026-11-12T14:00 egress_169.254.169.254 200 x3
Cloudflare: 118.100.234.120 → <internal-host> 776 req 2026-11-12T13:39Z–17:08Z (481 via ffuf)
      

The timestamp marks an hourly bucket, not an individual request. The service-offline action is from the responders' record; the metadata response contents remain unknown.

  • It confirms an account 21 seconds after signing upThe attacker created [email protected], username auwiqns, from 118.100.234.120 at 14:00:41 UTC. It confirmed the account at 14:01:02 UTC, 21 seconds later, and received its own workspace. At 14:05 UTC, the edge recorded a successful sign-in request from the same address.Outcome: Account confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisJoin account-creation and confirmation logs to earlier source-address scanning so a new account does not reset an existing risk signal.EvidenceApplication database change history3 [email protected] username auwiqns created 2026-11-12 14:00:41 confirmed 2026-11-12 14:01:02 118.100.234.120 2026-11-12 14:01:02 → 18:49:47 Cloudflare: 2026-11-12T14:05Z 118.100.234.120 POST app.bitrise.io <sign-in endpoint> 201 The second line is the account’s sign-in-IP window, not a continuous connection. The edge sign-in time is available only to the minute; its endpoint path is generalized while method, timestamp and status are retained.

It confirms an account 21 seconds after signing up

The attacker created [email protected], username auwiqns, from 118.100.234.120 at 14:00:41 UTC. It confirmed the account at 14:01:02 UTC, 21 seconds later, and received its own workspace. At 14:05 UTC, the edge recorded a successful sign-in request from the same address.

Outcome: Account confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisJoin account-creation and confirmation logs to earlier source-address scanning so a new account does not reset an existing risk signal.


        [email protected] username auwiqns created 2026-11-12 14:00:41 confirmed 2026-11-12 14:01:02
118.100.234.120 2026-11-12 14:01:02 → 18:49:47
Cloudflare: 2026-11-12T14:05Z 118.100.234.120 POST app.bitrise.io <sign-in endpoint> 201
      

The second line is the account’s sign-in-IP window, not a continuous connection. The edge sign-in time is available only to the minute; its endpoint path is generalized while method, timestamp and status are retained.

  • It asks for other tenants’ signing files; every request is refusedThe attacker created personal access tokens and two workspace API tokens, then requested signing and project file lists for six public open-source apps in other tenants. It tested whether changing an app identifier could bypass ownership checks. Every file-list request to those tenants returned HTTP 404. A separate outgoing-webhook check returned HTTP 403.The attacker created idor-probe-812 and made the same file-list requests against its own app as a control. Those returned HTTP 200. A public-app listing returned public data as designed. The workspace-token service users were created at 14:38:02 and deleted around 14:38:22 UTC.Outcome: File requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing one account receiving 404 or 403 across unowned sensitive resources while matching requests to its own resource return 200.EvidenceApplication request logs13 lines2026-11-12T14:34:20.433 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/android-keystore-files 404 2026-11-12T14:34:31.935 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404 2026-11-12T14:34:39.631 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 404 2026-11-12T14:34:43.011 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/generic-project-files 404 2026-11-12T14:34:43.842 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404 2026-11-12T14:34:44.317 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 404 2026-11-12T14:35:42.464 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 200 (own app idor-probe-812) 2026-11-12T14:35:43.302 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/android-keystore-files 200 (own) 2026-11-12T14:35:43.715 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/generic-project-files 200 (own) 2026-11-12T14:35:59.558 GET /v0.1/organizations/<workspace>/apps 200 2026-11-12T14:36:38.475 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404 2026-11-12T14:36:39.178 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 200 (own) CDC workspace-token service users: <service-account>, <service-account> created 14:38:02, deleted ~14:38:22 The six-app scope comes from request and ownership records. These rows show the file-list and control calls, made with curl/7.88.1; the separate 403 webhook result is not among them. None of these requests disclosed another tenant’s files.

It asks for other tenants’ signing files; every request is refused

The attacker created personal access tokens and two workspace API tokens, then requested signing and project file lists for six public open-source apps in other tenants. It tested whether changing an app identifier could bypass ownership checks. Every file-list request to those tenants returned HTTP 404. A separate outgoing-webhook check returned HTTP 403.

The attacker created idor-probe-812 and made the same file-list requests against its own app as a control. Those returned HTTP 200. A public-app listing returned public data as designed. The workspace-token service users were created at 14:38:02 and deleted around 14:38:22 UTC.

Outcome: File requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on request logs showing one account receiving 404 or 403 across unowned sensitive resources while matching requests to its own resource return 200.


        2026-11-12T14:34:20.433 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/android-keystore-files 404
2026-11-12T14:34:31.935 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404
2026-11-12T14:34:39.631 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 404
2026-11-12T14:34:43.011 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/generic-project-files 404
2026-11-12T14:34:43.842 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404
2026-11-12T14:34:44.317 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 404
2026-11-12T14:35:42.464 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/provisioning-profiles 200 (own app idor-probe-812)
2026-11-12T14:35:43.302 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/android-keystore-files 200 (own)
2026-11-12T14:35:43.715 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/generic-project-files 200 (own)
2026-11-12T14:35:59.558 GET /v0.1/organizations/<workspace>/apps 200
2026-11-12T14:36:38.475 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 404
2026-11-12T14:36:39.178 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/build-certificates 200 (own)
CDC workspace-token service users: <service-account>, <service-account> created 14:38:02, deleted ~14:38:22
      

The six-app scope comes from request and ownership records. These rows show the file-list and control calls, made with curl/7.88.1; the separate 403 webhook result is not among them. None of these requests disclosed another tenant’s files.

  • It runs its own scripts on our build machinesThe attacker created i871-probe, i901a and i901b, pointing them at octocat/Hello-World, a public placeholder repository. The first build started at 15:07:22 UTC. These builds ran attacker-written scripts on our build machines. Its earlier control app, idor-probe-812, had already been deleted.The account’s credentials were also used from our own egress address between 15:06:51 and 15:11:48 UTC. That timing is consistent with build scripts calling the Bitrise API from inside our network, rather than another external attacker address.Outcome: Build scripts ranEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisCorrelate account logs showing new placeholder-repository builds with platform API requests from build egress and immediate build-log retrieval.EvidenceApplication database change history7 linesrepo <app> idor-probe-812 <app> created 14:35:38 (deleted 14:38:31) repo <app> i871-probe <app> created 15:06:39 repo <app> i901a <app> created 15:28:32 repo <app> i901b <app> created 15:28:37 builds (repo <app> unless noted), all stack ubuntu-latest-stable: 15:07:22 probe 15:09:09 probe 15:10:31 probe (<app>) 15:25:59 probe 15:26:33 probe 15:29:24 i901probe (<app>) <our own egress address> 2026-11-12 15:06:51 → 15:11:48 Build execution and the internal-origin credential-use window are directly recorded; their causal link is inferred from timing. The earlier control app had been deleted before these builds.

It runs its own scripts on our build machines

The attacker created i871-probe, i901a and i901b, pointing them at octocat/Hello-World, a public placeholder repository. The first build started at 15:07:22 UTC. These builds ran attacker-written scripts on our build machines. Its earlier control app, idor-probe-812, had already been deleted.

The account’s credentials were also used from our own egress address between 15:06:51 and 15:11:48 UTC. That timing is consistent with build scripts calling the Bitrise API from inside our network, rather than another external attacker address.

Outcome: Build scripts ranEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisCorrelate account logs showing new placeholder-repository builds with platform API requests from build egress and immediate build-log retrieval.


        repo <app> idor-probe-812 <app> created 14:35:38 (deleted 14:38:31)
repo <app> i871-probe <app> created 15:06:39
repo <app> i901a <app> created 15:28:32
repo <app> i901b <app> created 15:28:37
builds (repo <app> unless noted), all stack ubuntu-latest-stable:
15:07:22 probe 15:09:09 probe 15:10:31 probe (<app>) 15:25:59 probe 15:26:33 probe 15:29:24 i901probe (<app>)
<our own egress address> 2026-11-12 15:06:51 → 15:11:48
      

Build execution and the internal-origin credential-use window are directly recorded; their causal link is inferred from timing. The earlier control app had been deleted before these builds.

  • It probes internal tools; no sign-in succeedsThe attacker tried many hostnames, including internal ones. Where it found them is not established. A likely source is Certificate Transparency logs: every publicly trusted TLS certificate is recorded there, so any hostname that has ever had one is public.It sent 61 requests to an internal security information and event management (SIEM) hostname. The tool behind it had been decommissioned, so every request returned HTTP 502.The attacker also requested sign-in and configuration endpoints on an internal LLM chat UI, Open WebUI. Its sign-in attempts failed.Outcome: Sign-ins refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisThere is not much to catch here. The lesson is that forgotten services and public pages will be probed: expect these agents to try every hostname that has ever had a public TLS certificate. Clean up leftover services to shrink your attack surface, and treat every hostname with a public certificate as public information.EvidenceLoad-balancer request logs8 lines61 entries, 2026-11-12T15:08:47 → 16:03:41, all status 502 statusDetails=failed_to_pick_backend e.g. 16:00:55 GET https://<internal-host>/_cat/indices ; 16:00:56 /_search ; 16:01:02 /_security/_authenticate ; 16:01:23 /wazuh 15:30:17 GET /api/v1/auths/signin 200 15:30:49–15:30:50 POST /api/v1/auths/signin 400 (x3) 15:30:51 POST /api/v1/auths/oauth/google/login 405 15:32:01 GET /api/v1/ollama/config 200 15:32:02 GET /api/v1/openai/config 200 15:32:02 GET /api/v1/rag/config 200 15:42:05 GET /api/v1/tools 200 15:45:09 GET /api/config 200 16:08:26–16:09:40 GET /oauth/google/login 302 (x2) The first two lines are SIEM load-balancer records from 118.100.234.120; the remaining excerpts are Open WebUI application access records. Configuration response codes are not an assertion about their contents.

It probes internal tools; no sign-in succeeds

The attacker tried many hostnames, including internal ones. Where it found them is not established. A likely source is Certificate Transparency logs: every publicly trusted TLS certificate is recorded there, so any hostname that has ever had one is public.

It sent 61 requests to an internal security information and event management (SIEM) hostname. The tool behind it had been decommissioned, so every request returned HTTP 502.

The attacker also requested sign-in and configuration endpoints on an internal LLM chat UI, Open WebUI. Its sign-in attempts failed.

Outcome: Sign-ins refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisThere is not much to catch here. The lesson is that forgotten services and public pages will be probed: expect these agents to try every hostname that has ever had a public TLS certificate. Clean up leftover services to shrink your attack surface, and treat every hostname with a public certificate as public information.


        61 entries, 2026-11-12T15:08:47 → 16:03:41, all status 502 statusDetails=failed_to_pick_backend
e.g. 16:00:55 GET https://<internal-host>/_cat/indices ; 16:00:56 /_search ; 16:01:02 /_security/_authenticate ; 16:01:23 /wazuh
15:30:17 GET /api/v1/auths/signin 200
15:30:49–15:30:50 POST /api/v1/auths/signin 400 (x3)
15:30:51 POST /api/v1/auths/oauth/google/login 405
15:32:01 GET /api/v1/ollama/config 200 15:32:02 GET /api/v1/openai/config 200 15:32:02 GET /api/v1/rag/config 200
15:42:05 GET /api/v1/tools 200 15:45:09 GET /api/config 200
16:08:26–16:09:40 GET /oauth/google/login 302 (x2)
      

The first two lines are SIEM load-balancer records from 118.100.234.120; the remaining excerpts are Open WebUI application access records. Configuration response codes are not an assertion about their contents.

  • It extracts a long-lived cloud key; every recorded call is deniedA build printed its machine’s startup script, which contains a long-lived cloud key that can only publish metrics. The key sends utilization figures such as CPU and memory to our dashboards. This is by design: we know that customer-controlled build code can read it, and we accept that. The build log recorded the extraction under the banner === I871C START.About 17 minutes later, at 15:27:12.062 UTC, the same key was used from 118.100.234.120. All 32 recorded cloud API calls on Nov 12 were denied. Another 50 calls from 74.211.97.67 on Nov 13 were also denied.Outcome: Recorded calls deniedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisWatch for the replay. Expect every secret an agent like this collects to be tried elsewhere within minutes, to probe for wider access. Here the key was in use from the attacker’s address about 17 minutes after the build printed it.EvidenceThe attacker's own build log12 lines=== I871C START Thu Nov 12 03:10:36 PM UTC 2026 === startup_script_bytes=22859 --- attribute keys --- startup-script json_type= service_account project_id= <project> client_email= <service-account> first last total ok ip 2026-11-12T15:27:12.062 2026-11-12T18:11:10.380 32 0 118.100.234.120 UA Python-urllib/3.12 and curl/7.88.1 2026-11-13T16:44:22.757 2026-11-13T19:53:34.334 50 0 74.211.97.67 2026-11-12T15:31:35Z secretmanager ListSecrets projects/<project> → PERMISSION_DENIED (IAM_PERMISSION_DENIED) 2026-11-13T21:38:39Z DisableServiceAccountKey by <employee> from <responder address> The build log and service-account JSON analysis establish extraction; our records match that key to later cloud-audit calls without publishing credential material. Nov 13 retries and disablement fall outside this step’s Nov 12 window, and denied calls cannot rule out unlogged metric publishes.

It extracts a long-lived cloud key; every recorded call is denied

A build printed its machine’s startup script, which contains a long-lived cloud key that can only publish metrics. The key sends utilization figures such as CPU and memory to our dashboards. This is by design: we know that customer-controlled build code can read it, and we accept that. The build log recorded the extraction under the banner === I871C START.

About 17 minutes later, at 15:27:12.062 UTC, the same key was used from 118.100.234.120. All 32 recorded cloud API calls on Nov 12 were denied. Another 50 calls from 74.211.97.67 on Nov 13 were also denied.

Outcome: Recorded calls deniedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisWatch for the replay. Expect every secret an agent like this collects to be tried elsewhere within minutes, to probe for wider access. Here the key was in use from the attacker’s address about 17 minutes after the build printed it.


        === I871C START Thu Nov 12 03:10:36 PM UTC 2026 ===
startup_script_bytes=22859
--- attribute keys ---
startup-script
json_type= service_account
project_id= <project>
client_email= <service-account>
first                    last                     total ok ip
2026-11-12T15:27:12.062 2026-11-12T18:11:10.380 32 0 118.100.234.120 UA Python-urllib/3.12 and curl/7.88.1
2026-11-13T16:44:22.757 2026-11-13T19:53:34.334 50 0 74.211.97.67
2026-11-12T15:31:35Z secretmanager ListSecrets projects/<project> → PERMISSION_DENIED (IAM_PERMISSION_DENIED)
2026-11-13T21:38:39Z DisableServiceAccountKey by <employee> from <responder address>
      

The build log and service-account JSON analysis establish extraction; our records match that key to later cloud-audit calls without publishing credential material. Nov 13 retries and disablement fall outside this step’s Nov 12 window, and denied calls cannot rule out unlogged metric publishes.

  • It reuses October’s public links, connecting the two phasesFrom 118.100.234.120, the attacker reopened install-page links for 11 apps, all in the October list of 70 used by 95.40.73.129. Reusing the same links with unguessable hashes ties the October and November activity to the same attacker.These sharing pages are public by design. Cloud storage recorded 11 successful object reads for three private customer apps, while other requested objects were missing. Five of those reads were for the customer penetration-testing app first fetched in October. These reads were not unauthorized access. The 56 page requests count page access, not successful object reads or unique downloaded files.11 apps from October list11 successful object reads3 private customer appsOutcome: Link reuse confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisCorrelate sharing-link request logs across source networks to identify reuse of the same unguessable links after earlier scanning and downloads.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)6 linesCloudflare 118.100.234.120 /app//installable-artifacts//public-install-page/*: 56 requests 2026-11-12T16:12Z–16:20Z (200 x48, 404 x8), 11 distinct apps GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), callerIp 118.100.234.120: first last n status app 2026-11-12T16:21:36.296 2026-11-12T16:22:08.018 5 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-11-12T16:21:37.002 2026-11-12T16:21:57.076 4 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) 2026-11-12T16:21:44.514 2026-11-12T16:21:55.980 2 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>) All 11 November app identifiers appeared among the 70 October apps, linking the activity beyond similarities in tools or names. Page requests and object reads measure different operations; NOT_FOUND means missing objects, not expiration.

It reuses October’s public links, connecting the two phases

From 118.100.234.120, the attacker reopened install-page links for 11 apps, all in the October list of 70 used by 95.40.73.129. Reusing the same links with unguessable hashes ties the October and November activity to the same attacker.

These sharing pages are public by design. Cloud storage recorded 11 successful object reads for three private customer apps, while other requested objects were missing. Five of those reads were for the customer penetration-testing app first fetched in October. These reads were not unauthorized access. The 56 page requests count page access, not successful object reads or unique downloaded files.

  • 11 apps from October list
  • 11 successful object reads
  • 3 private customer apps

Outcome: Link reuse confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisCorrelate sharing-link request logs across source networks to identify reuse of the same unguessable links after earlier scanning and downloads.


        Cloudflare 118.100.234.120 /app/*/installable-artifacts/*/public-install-page/*: 56 requests 2026-11-12T16:12Z–16:20Z (200 x48, 404 x8), 11 distinct apps
GCP storage.objects.get by <service-account> (signed URL), callerIp 118.100.234.120:
first                    last                     n status app
2026-11-12T16:21:36.296 2026-11-12T16:22:08.018 5 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-11-12T16:21:37.002 2026-11-12T16:21:57.076 4 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
2026-11-12T16:21:44.514 2026-11-12T16:21:55.980 2 OK apps/<app> (private, <workspace>)
      

All 11 November app identifiers appeared among the 70 October apps, linking the activity beyond similarities in tools or names. Page requests and object reads measure different operations; NOT_FOUND means missing objects, not expiration.

  • It tries several credential types; none authenticatesThe attacker tried the build-agent control-plane API with a build-scoped JWT, a signed token intended for a build. It also tried a personal access token and an agent token. Logs recorded 66 authentication failures from 118.100.234.120. None of the reviewed requests authenticated.Outcome: Authentication refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on authentication logs showing one source cycling credential header types against a control-plane API and repeatedly failing; never log credential values.EvidenceApplication request logs6 linesfirst_seen last_seen count message (shortened) 2026-11-12T17:17:30.595Z 2026-11-12T18:38:10.920Z 66 Failed to authenticate … Cf-Connecting-Ip:118.100.234.120 … User-Agent:curl/7.88.1 2026-11-12T17:38:59Z 2026-11-12T17:46:29Z 2 … X-Service-Token:<credential omitted> (build-scoped JWT, build <app>, <workspace>) 2026-11-12T17:38:25Z 2026-11-12T17:46:26Z 2 … X-Api-Key:<credential omitted> 2026-11-12T18:32:04Z 2026-11-12T18:38:44Z 4 … <agent-token header>:<credential omitted> Success check: same query with -"Failed to authenticate" → 0 results. The 66-failure summary ends at 18:38:10.920 UTC, but a credential-specific excerpt continues to 18:38:44 UTC; the broader window is retained without adding those rows to 66. Credential values, prefixes and internal service names are omitted.

It tries several credential types; none authenticates

The attacker tried the build-agent control-plane API with a build-scoped JWT, a signed token intended for a build. It also tried a personal access token and an agent token. Logs recorded 66 authentication failures from 118.100.234.120. None of the reviewed requests authenticated.

Outcome: Authentication refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on authentication logs showing one source cycling credential header types against a control-plane API and repeatedly failing; never log credential values.


        first_seen last_seen count message (shortened)
2026-11-12T17:17:30.595Z 2026-11-12T18:38:10.920Z 66 Failed to authenticate … Cf-Connecting-Ip:118.100.234.120 … User-Agent:curl/7.88.1
2026-11-12T17:38:59Z 2026-11-12T17:46:29Z 2 … X-Service-Token:<credential omitted> (build-scoped JWT, build <app>, <workspace>)
2026-11-12T17:38:25Z 2026-11-12T17:46:26Z 2 … X-Api-Key:<credential omitted>
2026-11-12T18:32:04Z 2026-11-12T18:38:44Z 4 … <agent-token header>:<credential omitted>
Success check: same query with -"Failed to authenticate" → 0 results.
      

The 66-failure summary ends at 18:38:10.920 UTC, but a credential-specific excerpt continues to 18:38:44 UTC; the broader window is retained without adding those rows to 66. Credential values, prefixes and internal service names are omitted.

  • It runs twelve more probing builds and fetches their logsThe attacker ran twelve more builds, then fetched each build’s log through the API. The workflow names advertised test areas: i1040probe, i1170certs, i1170den, i1170den2, i1170den3, i1222, i1222b, i1222c, i1246net, i1246net2, i1246net3 and i1294probe.The numbers are interpreted as ARTEX task (“intent”) numbers leaking into workflow names, not successful-attack counts. October’s i5938 and i6084 are higher than these November numbers, suggesting a separate or reinstalled ARTEX database. The counters are per installation, may include other targets and have gaps, so they cannot measure the work directed at Bitrise.Outcome: Probing builds ranEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisCorrelate workflow and API logs showing numbered probe, certificate or network names followed by repeated build-log fetches; use names as context, not proof.EvidenceApplication database change history4 lines2026-11-12 18:00:05 i1040probe 18:03:57 i1170certs 18:07:59 i1170den 18:11:00 i1170den2 18:13:19 i1170den3 2026-11-12 18:30:00 i1222 18:33:51 i1222b 18:36:40 i1222c 18:42:44 i1246net 18:46:55 i1246net2 2026-11-12 18:49:47 i1246net3 19:19:48 i1294probe (from 74.211.97.67) GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/builds/<build>/log at 16:39:54, 19:31:25 … Build times and names are directly recorded, but the ARTEX counter interpretation and database inference come from naming and code, not an ARTEX execution log. The log-retrieval excerpt illustrates requests rather than listing all twelve build-log fetches.

It runs twelve more probing builds and fetches their logs

The attacker ran twelve more builds, then fetched each build’s log through the API. The workflow names advertised test areas: i1040probe, i1170certs, i1170den, i1170den2, i1170den3, i1222, i1222b, i1222c, i1246net, i1246net2, i1246net3 and i1294probe.

The numbers are interpreted as ARTEX task (“intent”) numbers leaking into workflow names, not successful-attack counts. October’s i5938 and i6084 are higher than these November numbers, suggesting a separate or reinstalled ARTEX database. The counters are per installation, may include other targets and have gaps, so they cannot measure the work directed at Bitrise.

Outcome: Probing builds ranEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisCorrelate workflow and API logs showing numbered probe, certificate or network names followed by repeated build-log fetches; use names as context, not proof.


        2026-11-12 18:00:05 i1040probe 18:03:57 i1170certs 18:07:59 i1170den 18:11:00 i1170den2 18:13:19 i1170den3
2026-11-12 18:30:00 i1222 18:33:51 i1222b 18:36:40 i1222c 18:42:44 i1246net 18:46:55 i1246net2
2026-11-12 18:49:47 i1246net3 19:19:48 i1294probe (from 74.211.97.67)
GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/builds/<build>/log at 16:39:54, 19:31:25 …
      

Build times and names are directly recorded, but the ARTEX counter interpretation and database inference come from naming and code, not an ARTEX execution log. The log-retrieval excerpt illustrates requests rather than listing all twelve build-log fetches.

  • It moves the same account, app and token to a Los Angeles serverAt 19:13 UTC, the attacker used its existing token from 74.211.97.67, a rented Cluster Logic server in Los Angeles, to read its own i871-probe app. This was the first request from that address. At 19:19:43 UTC, the auwiqns account’s recorded sign-in IP changed to it.The same account, app and token moved from the Kuala Lumpur address to the Los Angeles server. That continuity ties the two addresses together. It does not establish the operator’s physical location.Outcome: Account move confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on token and account logs showing an account associated with probing moving from a subscriber network to a rented server.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)3 lines2026-11-12T19:13:00Z 74.211.97.67 GET api.bitrise.io /v0.1/apps/<app> 200 curl/7.88.1 CDC: <attacker account> current_sign_in_ip = 74.211.97.67 from 2026-11-12 19:19:43 WHOIS 74.211.97.67: Cluster Logic Inc (CL-1210) — same registrant as 74.82.199.230 Application change history supplies the account-IP change, and our records identify the first request’s existing token and app. This is stronger evidence than shared user agents or a provider match; the shared provider alone does not link 74.82.199.230.

It moves the same account, app and token to a Los Angeles server

At 19:13 UTC, the attacker used its existing token from 74.211.97.67, a rented Cluster Logic server in Los Angeles, to read its own i871-probe app. This was the first request from that address. At 19:19:43 UTC, the auwiqns account’s recorded sign-in IP changed to it.

The same account, app and token moved from the Kuala Lumpur address to the Los Angeles server. That continuity ties the two addresses together. It does not establish the operator’s physical location.

Outcome: Account move confirmedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on token and account logs showing an account associated with probing moving from a subscriber network to a rented server.


        2026-11-12T19:13:00Z 74.211.97.67 GET api.bitrise.io /v0.1/apps/<app> 200 curl/7.88.1
CDC: <attacker account> current_sign_in_ip = 74.211.97.67 from 2026-11-12 19:19:43
WHOIS 74.211.97.67: Cluster Logic Inc (CL-1210) — same registrant as 74.82.199.230
      

Application change history supplies the account-IP change, and our records identify the first request’s existing token and app. This is stronger evidence than shared user agents or a provider match; the shared provider alone does not link 74.82.199.230.

  • It probes the docs site, but the edge blocks the requestThe attacker tried server-side request forgery (SSRF), making a server fetch a URL of its choosing. Its request to docs.bitrise.io combined a cloud-metadata URL with a path aimed at /etc/passwd. The edge blocked it before it reached the origin. This was the first recorded block for 74.211.97.67.Outcome: Blocked at edgeEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on URL-fetching endpoints receiving metadata-address URLs or filesystem traversal paths, including requests blocked at the edge.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)1 line2026-11-13T09:37:00Z 74.211.97.67 GET docs.bitrise.io /og ?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&path=../../etc/passwd&image=http://evil/… 403 origin=0 action=block

It probes the docs site, but the edge blocks the request

The attacker tried server-side request forgery (SSRF), making a server fetch a URL of its choosing. Its request to docs.bitrise.io combined a cloud-metadata URL with a path aimed at /etc/passwd. The edge blocked it before it reached the origin. This was the first recorded block for 74.211.97.67.

Outcome: Blocked at edgeEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on URL-fetching endpoints receiving metadata-address URLs or filesystem traversal paths, including requests blocked at the edge.


        2026-11-13T09:37:00Z 74.211.97.67 GET docs.bitrise.io /og ?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&path=../../etc/passwd&image=http://evil/… 403 origin=0 action=block
      
  • It signs in to a test account last used in 2022At 11:46:48 UTC, the attacker signed in to a dormant internal test bot account. Two more sign-ins followed within 20 seconds. Starting at 11:45 UTC, one sign-in attempt each on three other bot accounts had been refused. Created in 2018 and last used in November 2022, the account still belonged to the internal workspace that builds and tests Bitrise's open-source build steps.Two-factor authentication was off. No password reset was requested, and no single sign-on identity was linked. That history points to password-based entry, but does not prove it. Where the password came from is not established.3 sign-ins in 20 secondsOutcome: Signed inEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert when a long-inactive privileged account signs in from a new network, especially after failed attempts on neighboring machine accounts.EvidenceApplication database change history5 lines2026-11-13 11:46:48 u 15→16 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL 2026-11-13 11:47:04 u 17→18 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL 2026-11-13 11:47:08 u 19→20 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL CDC identities: no rows for user <employee> (no SSO/OAuth login) user <employee> member Organization <workspace> (snapshot 2025-06-20; removed 2026-11-13 19:26:43) The selected change-history rows show sign-in counts, failed counts, source IPs and password-reset timestamps. Request logs record three refused attempts on other bots, not a failed attempt on this bot.

It signs in to a test account last used in 2022

At 11:46:48 UTC, the attacker signed in to a dormant internal test bot account. Two more sign-ins followed within 20 seconds. Starting at 11:45 UTC, one sign-in attempt each on three other bot accounts had been refused. Created in 2018 and last used in November 2022, the account still belonged to the internal workspace that builds and tests Bitrise's open-source build steps.

Two-factor authentication was off. No password reset was requested, and no single sign-on identity was linked. That history points to password-based entry, but does not prove it. Where the password came from is not established.

  • 3 sign-ins in 20 seconds

Outcome: Signed inEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert when a long-inactive privileged account signs in from a new network, especially after failed attempts on neighboring machine accounts.


        2026-11-13 11:46:48 u 15→16 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL
2026-11-13 11:47:04 u 17→18 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL
2026-11-13 11:47:08 u 19→20 1→0 74.211.97.67 NULL
CDC identities: no rows for user <employee> (no SSO/OAuth login)
user <employee> member Organization <workspace> (snapshot 2025-06-20; removed 2026-11-13 19:26:43)
      

The selected change-history rows show sign-in counts, failed counts, source IPs and password-reset timestamps. Request logs record three refused attempts on other bots, not a failed attempt on this bot.

  • It requests signing files and creates its own access tokensOne minute and 48 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker requested an Apple provisioning profile, which identifies where an app can run. It requested a build certificate at 11:48:40 UTC and an app's workflows at 11:48:47 UTC. Published research on ARTEX campaigns describes the same targeting of Apple signing certificates and provisioning profiles.At 11:54:45 UTC, the attacker created two web authentication tokens for itself under the compromised bot account. The signing responses returned links, not proof that every linked file was downloaded.Outcome: Signing links returnedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on signing-material requests followed by token creation immediately after a dormant account resumes activity.EvidenceApplication request logs6 lines11:48:36 | Provisioning profile of <app> | Apple signing 11:48:40 | Build certificate of <app> | Apple signing 11:48:47 | Workflows of <app> | Shows which secrets its builds use 11:54:45 | Creates 2 website auth tokens as the bot | A third at 14:06:52 GET /api/app/<app>/build_certificate/show.json 200 GET /api/app/<app>/prov_profile_document/show.json 200 Request logs give the exact seconds and token creation; the edge excerpt groups signing requests into the 11:48 UTC minute. Token creation was at T+7m57s.

It requests signing files and creates its own access tokens

One minute and 48 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker requested an Apple provisioning profile, which identifies where an app can run. It requested a build certificate at 11:48:40 UTC and an app's workflows at 11:48:47 UTC. Published research on ARTEX campaigns describes the same targeting of Apple signing certificates and provisioning profiles.

At 11:54:45 UTC, the attacker created two web authentication tokens for itself under the compromised bot account. The signing responses returned links, not proof that every linked file was downloaded.

Outcome: Signing links returnedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on signing-material requests followed by token creation immediately after a dormant account resumes activity.


        11:48:36 | Provisioning profile of <app> | Apple signing
11:48:40 | Build certificate of <app> | Apple signing
11:48:47 | Workflows of <app> | Shows which secrets its builds use
11:54:45 | Creates 2 website auth tokens as the bot | A third at 14:06:52
GET /api/app/<app>/build_certificate/show.json 200
GET /api/app/<app>/prov_profile_document/show.json 200
      

Request logs give the exact seconds and token creation; the edge excerpt groups signing requests into the 11:48 UTC minute. Token creation was at T+7m57s.

  • It reveals secrets by asking for them by nameEight minutes and 41 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker began revealing secrets in clear text through the web interface. It requested each by exact name: BITRISE_API_TOKEN at 11:55:29 UTC, a cloud storage credential at 11:55:43 UTC, then GITHUB_TOKEN at 11:55:49 UTC.These were Bitrise's own CI secrets, stored in our internal apps. They were not marked protected, so they were masked but an account with access could still reveal them. The initial session covered 29 distinct secret-value paths across about 20 internal apps in roughly the first half hour. It also included chat credentials, certificate passphrases and AWS keys. The revealed values cannot be matched to later credential use.Outcome: Secrets revealedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on rapid secret-reveal requests across multiple apps, including requests by exact name without a preceding secret-list request.EvidenceApplication request logs8 lines74.211.97.67 <employee> show 2026-11-13T11:55:29.712Z 2026-11-13T12:25:58.370Z 30 29 11:55:29 /apps/<app>/secrets/BITRISE_API_TOKEN 11:55:43 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret> 11:55:49 /apps/<app>/secrets/GITHUB_TOKEN 12:22:34 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret> 12:24:58 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret> 12:25:58 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret> GET /apps/<app>/secrets/BITRISE_API_TOKEN - 200 (OK) 23ms The initial bot-session excerpt counts 30 reveal requests on 29 distinct paths; it does not cover the later, broader set of secret requests. Whether the names were known beforehand or learned from the workflows is not established.

It reveals secrets by asking for them by name

Eight minutes and 41 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker began revealing secrets in clear text through the web interface. It requested each by exact name: BITRISE_API_TOKEN at 11:55:29 UTC, a cloud storage credential at 11:55:43 UTC, then GITHUB_TOKEN at 11:55:49 UTC.

These were Bitrise's own CI secrets, stored in our internal apps. They were not marked protected, so they were masked but an account with access could still reveal them. The initial session covered 29 distinct secret-value paths across about 20 internal apps in roughly the first half hour. It also included chat credentials, certificate passphrases and AWS keys. The revealed values cannot be matched to later credential use.

Outcome: Secrets revealedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on rapid secret-reveal requests across multiple apps, including requests by exact name without a preceding secret-list request.


        74.211.97.67 <employee> show 2026-11-13T11:55:29.712Z 2026-11-13T12:25:58.370Z 30 29
11:55:29 /apps/<app>/secrets/BITRISE_API_TOKEN
11:55:43 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret>
11:55:49 /apps/<app>/secrets/GITHUB_TOKEN
12:22:34 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret>
12:24:58 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret>
12:25:58 /apps/<app>/secrets/<secret>
GET /apps/<app>/secrets/BITRISE_API_TOKEN - 200 (OK) 23ms
      

The initial bot-session excerpt counts 30 reveal requests on 29 distinct paths; it does not cover the later, broader set of secret requests. Whether the names were known beforehand or learned from the workflows is not established.

  • It tries cloud keys, and some workTen minutes and 37 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker began using cloud service-account keys from its address. This was about two minutes after the first cloud credential reveal. The first identity's calls were denied. A build-steps project identity for Terraform, an infrastructure configuration tool, made 396 successful calls out of 454 over the day.Secret values are not logged, so which secret became which key is linked by timing, not proven. The first three cloud identities made reads, listings and project lookups. No create, update, delete or permission-change calls were recorded.396 / 454 successful / total calls for one keyOutcome: Some keys workedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisCorrelate secret-reveal events with first-seen external use of service-account keys in the following minutes.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)3 lines2026-11-13T11:57:25.345 2026-11-13T19:53:49.282 86 0 <service-account> <key> 2026-11-13T11:57:49.175 2026-11-13T19:53:34.333 454 396 <service-account> <key> 2026-11-13T11:58:40.023 2026-11-13T19:53:50.041 73 2 <service-account> <key> The rows show first and last calls, total and successful calls, then the redacted principal and key. Only reads, listings and project lookups are recorded for these three identities.

It tries cloud keys, and some work

Ten minutes and 37 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker began using cloud service-account keys from its address. This was about two minutes after the first cloud credential reveal. The first identity's calls were denied. A build-steps project identity for Terraform, an infrastructure configuration tool, made 396 successful calls out of 454 over the day.

Secret values are not logged, so which secret became which key is linked by timing, not proven. The first three cloud identities made reads, listings and project lookups. No create, update, delete or permission-change calls were recorded.

  • 396 / 454 successful / total calls for one key

Outcome: Some keys workedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisCorrelate secret-reveal events with first-seen external use of service-account keys in the following minutes.


        2026-11-13T11:57:25.345 2026-11-13T19:53:49.282 86 0 <service-account> <key>
2026-11-13T11:57:49.175 2026-11-13T19:53:34.333 454 396 <service-account> <key>
2026-11-13T11:58:40.023 2026-11-13T19:53:50.041 73 2 <service-account> <key>
      

The rows show first and last calls, total and successful calls, then the redacted principal and key. Only reads, listings and project lookups are recorded for these three identities.

  • It downloads Bitrise's own signing filesTwelve minutes and 34 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker downloaded the first Apple signing file from cloud storage. It downloaded up to 81 Apple signing files from the primary and backup buckets. Other successful reads included App Store Connect API keys and Android keystores. These were Bitrise's own signing files.It also read certificate passphrases from internal build-step apps at 12:23–12:26 UTC. It tried AWS keys found in secrets from 12:05 UTC. Those calls were denied because the key had already been rotated.81 Apple signing files, upper boundOutcome: Signing files readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on external reads of signing-file objects and correlate them with certificate-passphrase reveals and denied use of already-rotated cloud keys.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)7 linesSelected successful storage.objects.get: 11:59:22 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12 12:03:06 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p8 12:07:34 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12 12:09:36 <bucket>/<signing-file>.keystore 12:10:03 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p8 14:34:29–14:35:05 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12 (15 files) The selected cloud rows generalize object names; the 81-file upper bound also includes later backup reads. The passphrase window and AWS denial are from our records; no raw AWS request excerpt is shown.

It downloads Bitrise's own signing files

Twelve minutes and 34 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker downloaded the first Apple signing file from cloud storage. It downloaded up to 81 Apple signing files from the primary and backup buckets. Other successful reads included App Store Connect API keys and Android keystores. These were Bitrise's own signing files.

It also read certificate passphrases from internal build-step apps at 12:23–12:26 UTC. It tried AWS keys found in secrets from 12:05 UTC. Those calls were denied because the key had already been rotated.

  • 81 Apple signing files, upper bound

Outcome: Signing files readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on external reads of signing-file objects and correlate them with certificate-passphrase reveals and denied use of already-rotated cloud keys.


        Selected successful storage.objects.get:
11:59:22 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12
12:03:06 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p8
12:07:34 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12
12:09:36 <bucket>/<signing-file>.keystore
12:10:03 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p8
14:34:29–14:35:05 <bucket>/<signing-file>.p12 (15 files)
      

The selected cloud rows generalize object names; the 81-file upper bound also includes later backup reads. The passphrase window and AWS denial are from our records; no raw AWS request excerpt is shown.

  • It reads build logs of Bitrise’s own apps, and 13 customer logsThrough the API, the attacker read about 870 build logs from Bitrise’s own internal apps between 12:22 and 17:33 UTC. Build logs can contain secrets that were not masked.In the same activity it read 13 diagnostic build logs from May 2026 that belonged to customers. They contain short snippets of source or test code, a few lines at a time; one contained a credential and another an email address. Every customer concerned was contacted.The cloud-storage downloads at 15:40–17:33 UTC were the same reads, not additional logs.about 870 build logs from Bitrise’s own apps13 customer diagnostic logsOutcome: Build logs readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on one identity or source retrieving build logs across many apps, joining API requests and signed storage downloads so they are not counted twice.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)2 linesprincipal <service-account> (signed URL) callerIp 74.211.97.67 first 2026-11-13T15:40:05.088 last 2026-11-13T17:33:08.629 819 storage.objects.get, 819 OK The storage rows cover only part of the API activity. In total about 880 build logs were read across 52 apps: 13 customer diagnostic logs, and the rest from Bitrise’s own internal apps. Storage downloads must not be added to that total.

It reads build logs of Bitrise’s own apps, and 13 customer logs

Through the API, the attacker read about 870 build logs from Bitrise’s own internal apps between 12:22 and 17:33 UTC. Build logs can contain secrets that were not masked.

In the same activity it read 13 diagnostic build logs from May 2026 that belonged to customers. They contain short snippets of source or test code, a few lines at a time; one contained a credential and another an email address. Every customer concerned was contacted.

The cloud-storage downloads at 15:40–17:33 UTC were the same reads, not additional logs.

  • about 870 build logs from Bitrise’s own apps
  • 13 customer diagnostic logs

Outcome: Build logs readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on one identity or source retrieving build logs across many apps, joining API requests and signed storage downloads so they are not counted twice.


        principal <service-account> (signed URL) callerIp 74.211.97.67
first 2026-11-13T15:40:05.088 last 2026-11-13T17:33:08.629 819 storage.objects.get, 819 OK
      

The storage rows cover only part of the API activity. In total about 880 build logs were read across 52 apps: 13 customer diagnostic logs, and the rest from Bitrise’s own internal apps. Storage downloads must not be added to that total.

  • It uses an engineer's token to reach more internal workspacesThirty-six minutes and 15 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker used an engineer's API token from 74.211.97.67. The real engineer was active from another country. The token opened more than 20 internal workspaces.The attacker then read CI secrets broadly across those workspaces: 1,842 single-secret requests were answered HTTP 200 on 385 of Bitrise's own internal apps. This is an upper bound on requests, not a count of returned values: an empty answer also returns 200, and secret values are not logged.It targeted code-host, container-registry, package-registry, edge-provider, chat and observability tokens, cloud keys and an SSH private key. How the engineer's token was obtained is not established.385 internal Bitrise apps with single-secret HTTP 200s (upper bound)Outcome: Broader internal accessEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on an API identity used concurrently from different countries and on sudden secret-list or reveal activity across many workspaces.EvidenceApplication request logs4 lines74.211.97.67 2026-11-13 12:23:03 → 17:28:05 (attacker) <employee> show 12:24:44.605 → 17:27:56.376 75 reads / 75 paths <employee> index 12:41:18.277 → 16:40:54.112 139 / 133 2,656 secret-list requests on 1,087 apps and 1,842 single-secret requests answered 200 on 385 apps over 626 names (rehydrated logs; upper bound). The identity-specific excerpt covers fewer requests than the full set of recorded requests. Every app counted in the last line was one of Bitrise's own internal apps. No exact secret-to-token match is established.

It uses an engineer's token to reach more internal workspaces

Thirty-six minutes and 15 seconds after the sign-in, the attacker used an engineer's API token from 74.211.97.67. The real engineer was active from another country. The token opened more than 20 internal workspaces.

The attacker then read CI secrets broadly across those workspaces: 1,842 single-secret requests were answered HTTP 200 on 385 of Bitrise's own internal apps. This is an upper bound on requests, not a count of returned values: an empty answer also returns 200, and secret values are not logged.

It targeted code-host, container-registry, package-registry, edge-provider, chat and observability tokens, cloud keys and an SSH private key. How the engineer's token was obtained is not established.

  • 385 internal Bitrise apps with single-secret HTTP 200s (upper bound)

Outcome: Broader internal accessEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on an API identity used concurrently from different countries and on sudden secret-list or reveal activity across many workspaces.


        74.211.97.67 2026-11-13 12:23:03 → 17:28:05 (attacker)
<employee> show 12:24:44.605 → 17:27:56.376 75 reads / 75 paths
<employee> index 12:41:18.277 → 16:40:54.112 139 / 133
2,656 secret-list requests on 1,087 apps and 1,842 single-secret requests answered 200 on 385 apps over 626 names (rehydrated logs; upper bound).
      

The identity-specific excerpt covers fewer requests than the full set of recorded requests. Every app counted in the last line was one of Bitrise's own internal apps. No exact secret-to-token match is established.

  • It fails to sign in to more bots, but another token worksThe attacker made nine more sign-in attempts on other bot names from 12:41 to 12:56 UTC. All failed. It separately used an internal service account's token to list builds and read build logs from 12:45:55 to 12:58:56 UTC. How it was obtained is not established.Outcome: Partly workedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on repeated bot-account sign-in failures and on service-account tokens used from a network absent from their normal history.EvidenceApplication request logs5 linesA second round of 9 logins on other bot names (12:41–12:56) all failed. <employee> current_sign_in_ip 74.211.97.67 2026-11-13 12:45:55 → 12:58:56 (8 sign-ins) 12:48:51 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/builds?limit=50 12:52:20 GET …/builds/<build>/log 12:54:06 GET …/builds/<build> (python-requests/2.34.2) Request logs record the failed sign-ins and selected build requests. Database change history gives the service-account interval.

It fails to sign in to more bots, but another token works

The attacker made nine more sign-in attempts on other bot names from 12:41 to 12:56 UTC. All failed. It separately used an internal service account's token to list builds and read build logs from 12:45:55 to 12:58:56 UTC. How it was obtained is not established.

Outcome: Partly workedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on repeated bot-account sign-in failures and on service-account tokens used from a network absent from their normal history.


        A second round of 9 logins on other bot names (12:41–12:56) all failed.
<employee> current_sign_in_ip 74.211.97.67 2026-11-13 12:45:55 → 12:58:56 (8 sign-ins)
12:48:51 GET /v0.1/apps/<app>/builds?limit=50
12:52:20 GET …/builds/<build>/log
12:54:06 GET …/builds/<build> (python-requests/2.34.2)
      

Request logs record the failed sign-ins and selected build requests. Database change history gives the service-account interval.

  • It tries about 40 cloud keys, but most are deniedThe attacker tried about 40 harvested cloud service-account keys in seven minutes. Most were denied. A few worked with narrow rights, including bucket listings in a small number of projects. How each key was obtained is not established.about 40 cloud keys tried in seven minutesOutcome: Most keys deniedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert when one external source presents many distinct service-account identities within minutes, including identities whose calls are all denied.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)6 linesprincipals first used 14:59–15:06 (total / succeeded) <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 4/0 <service-account> 33/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 38/0 <service-account> 7/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 29/2 <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 5/0, <service-account> 51/1 <service-account> 5/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 43/4 The rows show selected principal counts; the approximate key count and exact window are from the responders' record. The listed counts are operations, not resources or downloaded files.

It tries about 40 cloud keys, but most are denied

The attacker tried about 40 harvested cloud service-account keys in seven minutes. Most were denied. A few worked with narrow rights, including bucket listings in a small number of projects. How each key was obtained is not established.

  • about 40 cloud keys tried in seven minutes

Outcome: Most keys deniedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert when one external source presents many distinct service-account identities within minutes, including identities whose calls are all denied.


        principals first used 14:59–15:06 (total / succeeded)
<service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 4/0
<service-account> 33/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 38/0
<service-account> 7/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 29/2
<service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 5/0, <service-account> 51/1
<service-account> 5/0, <service-account> 4/0, <service-account> 43/4
      

The rows show selected principal counts; the approximate key count and exact window are from the responders' record. The listed counts are operations, not resources or downloaded files.

  • It uses a sandbox key to read secrets and infrastructure stateThe attacker used a sandbox project's test key with broad rights: 957 of its 1,040 calls succeeded. It read 44 distinct secrets through 123 successful value-read requests in Secret Manager, the cloud secret store. These included a GitHub App private key and the build control plane's admin secret.It also read Terraform state for test environments, records of deployed infrastructure that can contain credentials. Secret names alone do not prove which later credential use came from each read. How the test key was obtained is not established.957 / 1,040 successful / total calls44 distinct secrets read123 successful secret-value readsOutcome: Sandbox secrets readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on test identities reading many distinct secrets or infrastructure-state objects, especially from outside their expected automation networks.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)6 linesprincipal <service-account> key <key> 2026-11-13T15:05:11.253 → 19:53:30.736 1040 calls, 957 OK AccessSecretVersion OK 15:12:15.937 → 19:36:00.154 123 calls, 44 distinct secrets (projects/<project>/secrets/…): <secret>, <secret>, <secret>, <secret> + 23 test/sandbox secrets storage.objects.get OK: <bucket>/<object>.tfstate, <bucket>/<object>.tfstate, <bucket>/*/<object>.tfstate (12) Selected audit-log rows have secret and resource names generalized. This project had secret-value read audit logging enabled; the excerpt supports value-read requests rather than merely secret-name listings.

It uses a sandbox key to read secrets and infrastructure state

The attacker used a sandbox project's test key with broad rights: 957 of its 1,040 calls succeeded. It read 44 distinct secrets through 123 successful value-read requests in Secret Manager, the cloud secret store. These included a GitHub App private key and the build control plane's admin secret.

It also read Terraform state for test environments, records of deployed infrastructure that can contain credentials. Secret names alone do not prove which later credential use came from each read. How the test key was obtained is not established.

  • 957 / 1,040 successful / total calls
  • 44 distinct secrets read
  • 123 successful secret-value reads

Outcome: Sandbox secrets readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on test identities reading many distinct secrets or infrastructure-state objects, especially from outside their expected automation networks.


        principal <service-account> key <key>
2026-11-13T15:05:11.253 → 19:53:30.736 1040 calls, 957 OK
AccessSecretVersion OK 15:12:15.937 → 19:36:00.154 123 calls, 44 distinct secrets (projects/<project>/secrets/…):
<secret>, <secret>, <secret>, <secret>
+ 23 test/sandbox secrets
storage.objects.get OK: <bucket>/<object>.tfstate, <bucket>/<object>.tfstate, <bucket>/*/<object>.tfstate (12)
      

Selected audit-log rows have secret and resource names generalized. This project had secret-value read audit logging enabled; the excerpt supports value-read requests rather than merely secret-name listings.

  • It clones private code, but a push changes nothingThe attacker used two deploy keys, credentials for repository access, to clone Bitrise's private repositories. A push at 15:06:05 UTC, seven seconds after a clone, changed nothing. No repository reference update was recorded, and no build was triggered. How the keys were obtained is not established.Outcome: Cloned without changesEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on deploy-key use outside CI networks and on push attempts by credentials that normally only clone repositories.EvidenceGitHub audit log export5 lines2026-11-13T15:05:45Z git.clone deploy_key <repo> key <key> 2026-11-13T15:05:58Z git.clone deploy_key <repo> key <key> 2026-11-13T15:06:05Z git.push deploy_key <repo> key <key> 2026-11-13T15:57:24Z / 15:57:33Z git.clone (x2) <repo> protected_branch.rejected_ref_update for this repo: none Our records show no repository reference update after the legitimate 12:58:52 UTC update. A recorded push operation is not proof that a change landed; the reason it changed nothing is not established.

It clones private code, but a push changes nothing

The attacker used two deploy keys, credentials for repository access, to clone Bitrise's private repositories. A push at 15:06:05 UTC, seven seconds after a clone, changed nothing. No repository reference update was recorded, and no build was triggered. How the keys were obtained is not established.

Outcome: Cloned without changesEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on deploy-key use outside CI networks and on push attempts by credentials that normally only clone repositories.


        2026-11-13T15:05:45Z git.clone deploy_key <repo> key <key>
2026-11-13T15:05:58Z git.clone deploy_key <repo> key <key>
2026-11-13T15:06:05Z git.push deploy_key <repo> key <key>
2026-11-13T15:57:24Z / 15:57:33Z git.clone (x2) <repo>
protected_branch.rejected_ref_update for this repo: none
      

Our records show no repository reference update after the legitimate 12:58:52 UTC update. A recorded push operation is not proof that a change landed; the reason it changed nothing is not established.

  • It tries control-plane credentials, but every request is rejectedThe attacker tried about 20 forged or misused JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), signed authentication tokens, against the build control-plane admin API. All were rejected. Requests presenting the stolen admin secret were also rejected. The attempts began before our investigation and continued during the response.Outcome: Authentication rejectedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on repeated control-plane authentication failures that cycle through token formats and credential-header types from one source.EvidenceApplication request logs2 lines2026-11-13T19:38:56Z 2026-11-13T19:39:23Z 2 … <admin-secret-header>:<secret> Cf-Connecting-Ip:74.211.97.67 Success check: same query with -"Failed to authenticate" → 0 results. The rows show admin-secret failures and a check that found no accepted requests. Our records show about 20 JWT attempts during 16:11–19:52 UTC; credential values are omitted.

It tries control-plane credentials, but every request is rejected

The attacker tried about 20 forged or misused JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), signed authentication tokens, against the build control-plane admin API. All were rejected. Requests presenting the stolen admin secret were also rejected. The attempts began before our investigation and continued during the response.

Outcome: Authentication rejectedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on repeated control-plane authentication failures that cycle through token formats and credential-header types from one source.


        2026-11-13T19:38:56Z 2026-11-13T19:39:23Z 2 … <admin-secret-header>:<secret> Cf-Connecting-Ip:74.211.97.67
Success check: same query with -"Failed to authenticate" → 0 results.
      

The rows show admin-secret failures and a check that found no accepted requests. Our records show about 20 JWT attempts during 16:11–19:52 UTC; credential values are omitted.

  • It uses a bot token to clone eight internal repositoriesThe attacker used a bot account's classic personal access token to clone eight internal repositories. Cloning began at 16:30:20 UTC and continued after our investigation started. A GitHub token revealed earlier is a possible source. How it was obtained is not established.8 internal repositories clonedOutcome: Internal code clonedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on bot tokens cloning multiple private repositories from a first-seen external address.EvidenceGitHub audit log export5 lines2026-11-13T16:30:20Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> PAT (classic) 2026-11-13T16:36:58Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> 2026-11-13T16:37:05Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> 2026-11-13T16:46:47Z … 16:47:18Z <repo>, <repo>, <repo>, <repo> 2026-11-13T17:25:47Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> Repository names, bot identity and all authentication fragments are omitted. The first clone time is not the time at which responders detected the access.

It uses a bot token to clone eight internal repositories

The attacker used a bot account's classic personal access token to clone eight internal repositories. Cloning began at 16:30:20 UTC and continued after our investigation started. A GitHub token revealed earlier is a possible source. How it was obtained is not established.

  • 8 internal repositories cloned

Outcome: Internal code clonedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on bot tokens cloning multiple private repositories from a first-seen external address.


        2026-11-13T16:30:20Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> PAT (classic)
2026-11-13T16:36:58Z git.clone <service-account> <repo>
2026-11-13T16:37:05Z git.clone <service-account> <repo>
2026-11-13T16:46:47Z … 16:47:18Z <repo>, <repo>, <repo>, <repo>
2026-11-13T17:25:47Z git.clone <service-account> <repo>
      

Repository names, bot identity and all authentication fragments are omitted. The first clone time is not the time at which responders detected the access.

  • We begin investigating suspicious behaviorWe began investigating suspicious behavior at 16:32 UTC. The attacker continued expanding access while the investigation was under way.Outcome: Investigation startedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record1 lineNovember 13, 16:32 UTC. Promptly after identifying suspicious behavior, an investigation was initiated; meanwhile, the attacker expanded their access as the investigation was under way. The time is from the responders' record.

We begin investigating suspicious behavior

We began investigating suspicious behavior at 16:32 UTC. The attacker continued expanding access while the investigation was under way.

Outcome: Investigation startedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        November 13, 16:32 UTC. Promptly after identifying suspicious behavior, an investigation was initiated; meanwhile, the attacker expanded their access as the investigation was under way.
      

The time is from the responders' record.

  • It tries tokens for more user accountsThe attacker tried more user-account tokens between 17:39 and 20:06 UTC. Requests for three additional user accounts began at 18:33:09.770 UTC, with four requests recorded. How the tokens were obtained is not established.Outcome: More tokens triedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert when one external address presents tokens for several user identities, even if each identity makes only one or two requests.EvidenceApplication request logs3 lines74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T18:33:09.770Z 2026-11-13T20:05:28.022Z 2 74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T20:04:44.708Z 2026-11-13T20:04:44.708Z 1 74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T20:06:17.768Z 2026-11-13T20:06:17.768Z 1 The broader token-trial window begins at 17:39 UTC; the three-account, four-request record begins later and does not identify three distinct employees. The rows give no response status codes.

It tries tokens for more user accounts

The attacker tried more user-account tokens between 17:39 and 20:06 UTC. Requests for three additional user accounts began at 18:33:09.770 UTC, with four requests recorded. How the tokens were obtained is not established.

Outcome: More tokens triedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert when one external address presents tokens for several user identities, even if each identity makes only one or two requests.


        74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T18:33:09.770Z 2026-11-13T20:05:28.022Z 2
74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T20:04:44.708Z 2026-11-13T20:04:44.708Z 1
74.211.97.67 <employee> 2026-11-13T20:06:17.768Z 2026-11-13T20:06:17.768Z 1
      

The broader token-trial window begins at 17:39 UTC; the three-account, four-request record begins later and does not identify three distinct employees. The rows give no response status codes.

  • We declare a SEV-1, our highest incident levelWe declared a SEV-1, our highest incident level, at 17:42 UTC. At first the attack seemed contained. Then new findings kept arriving, and the facts were changing by the minute.Outcome: SEV-1 declaredEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record1 lineWe declared a SEV-1, our highest incident level at 17:42. The time is from Bitrise's published preliminary review of Nov 18, 2026.

We declare a SEV-1, our highest incident level

We declared a SEV-1, our highest incident level, at 17:42 UTC. At first the attack seemed contained. Then new findings kept arriving, and the facts were changing by the minute.

Outcome: SEV-1 declaredEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        We declared a SEV-1, our highest incident level at 17:42.
      

The time is from Bitrise's published preliminary review of Nov 18, 2026.

  • It uses an existing OAuth grant to read Workspace dataThe attacker used an employee's OAuth grant, permission previously given to an internal app to call Google Workspace APIs. It made 61 API calls covering calendar entries, the internal directory and two internal spreadsheets.No attacker address was recorded signing in to a Workspace account. This access used an existing grant, so login records alone would not show it. How the grant's credentials were obtained is not established.61 Workspace API callsOutcome: Workspace data readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisMonitor OAuth-token and API-activity reports as well as sign-ins, and alert on calendar or directory enumeration from a first-seen network.EvidenceGoogle Workspace audit reports6 lines61 events, 2026-11-13T17:57:49Z → 18:05:12Z, actor <employee>, app <app> 49 calendar.events.list, 4 people.listDirectoryPeople, 3 calendarList.list, 2 sheets.values.get, 2 sheets.get, 1 people.searchDirectoryPeople sum(num_response_bytes) = 964,330 18:04:59, 18:05:03 <document> 18:05:08, 18:05:13 <document> login ip <each of 118.100.234.120, 74.211.97.67, 74.82.199.230, 95.40.73.129>: 0 events The token-event report ends at 18:05:12 UTC; the separate document-access report includes an event at 18:05:13 UTC. Document titles, IDs, the employee identity and the OAuth client ID are omitted.

It uses an existing OAuth grant to read Workspace data

The attacker used an employee's OAuth grant, permission previously given to an internal app to call Google Workspace APIs. It made 61 API calls covering calendar entries, the internal directory and two internal spreadsheets.

No attacker address was recorded signing in to a Workspace account. This access used an existing grant, so login records alone would not show it. How the grant's credentials were obtained is not established.

  • 61 Workspace API calls

Outcome: Workspace data readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisMonitor OAuth-token and API-activity reports as well as sign-ins, and alert on calendar or directory enumeration from a first-seen network.


        61 events, 2026-11-13T17:57:49Z → 18:05:12Z, actor <employee>, app <app>
49 calendar.events.list, 4 people.listDirectoryPeople, 3 calendarList.list, 2 sheets.values.get, 2 sheets.get, 1 people.searchDirectoryPeople
sum(num_response_bytes) = 964,330
18:04:59, 18:05:03 <document>
18:05:08, 18:05:13 <document>
login ip <each of 118.100.234.120, 74.211.97.67, 74.82.199.230, 95.40.73.129>: 0 events
      

The token-event report ends at 18:05:12 UTC; the separate document-access report includes an event at 18:05:13 UTC. Document titles, IDs, the employee identity and the OAuth client ID are omitted.

  • It uses an engineer's cloud login to read infrastructure stateThe attacker used an engineer's own cloud command-line login rather than a service-account key. All 294 recorded calls succeeded, including 237 Terraform state-object reads. State can contain plain-text credentials as well as infrastructure details. How the credential was obtained is not established.294 / 294 successful / total calls237 Terraform state-object readsOutcome: State objects readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on personal cloud command-line credentials used from hosting-provider networks and on unusual batches of infrastructure-state reads.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)3 linesprincipal <employee> 2026-11-13T19:13:29.447 → 19:54:20.530 294 calls / 294 OK storage.objects.get 237 (<bucket> 232, <bucket> 5) ListSecrets 23, storage.buckets.list 14, ListSecretVersions 3 (19:36:40–19:36:49), GetIamPolicy 3, instances.aggregatedList 1, ListClusters 1 The operation breakdown is selective, not a reconciliation of all 294 calls. The 237 state-object GETs are operations, not an assertion of 237 unique files.

It uses an engineer's cloud login to read infrastructure state

The attacker used an engineer's own cloud command-line login rather than a service-account key. All 294 recorded calls succeeded, including 237 Terraform state-object reads. State can contain plain-text credentials as well as infrastructure details. How the credential was obtained is not established.

  • 294 / 294 successful / total calls
  • 237 Terraform state-object reads

Outcome: State objects readEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on personal cloud command-line credentials used from hosting-provider networks and on unusual batches of infrastructure-state reads.


        principal <employee> 2026-11-13T19:13:29.447 → 19:54:20.530 294 calls / 294 OK
storage.objects.get 237 (<bucket> 232, <bucket> 5)
ListSecrets 23, storage.buckets.list 14, ListSecretVersions 3 (19:36:40–19:36:49), GetIamPolicy 3, instances.aggregatedList 1, ListClusters 1
      

The operation breakdown is selective, not a reconciliation of all 294 calls. The 237 state-object GETs are operations, not an assertion of 237 unique files.

  • It tests webhooks, but internal access remains unprovenThe attacker sent four probes against a nonexistent workspace, then 23 test-webhook requests from its own workspace. Those 23 requests ran from 19:26:55 to 20:06:30 UTC. Every one returned HTTP 404. The feature asks Bitrise's server to fetch a supplied URL, making this another SSRF attempt.The destination URLs are not logged. An HTTP 404 does not establish whether an internal destination was reached.Outcome: All returned 404Evidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisAlert on repeated test-webhook requests and log their destinations safely so private, link-local and metadata targets can be identified.EvidenceApplication request logs5 lines2026-11-13T19:20:46Z POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks/test 401 19:20:49 POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks 401 2026-11-13T19:23:30Z POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks/test 422 19:23:38 POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks 422 2026-11-13T19:26:55Z → 20:06:30Z POST /workspaces/<workspace>/outgoing-webhooks/test 404 x23 The logs record the requests and response codes, but not their destinations or any resulting internal access. The SSRF interpretation follows the feature's URL-fetching behavior.

It tests webhooks, but internal access remains unproven

The attacker sent four probes against a nonexistent workspace, then 23 test-webhook requests from its own workspace. Those 23 requests ran from 19:26:55 to 20:06:30 UTC. Every one returned HTTP 404. The feature asks Bitrise's server to fetch a supplied URL, making this another SSRF attempt.

The destination URLs are not logged. An HTTP 404 does not establish whether an internal destination was reached.

Outcome: All returned 404Evidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisAlert on repeated test-webhook requests and log their destinations safely so private, link-local and metadata targets can be identified.


        2026-11-13T19:20:46Z POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks/test 401
19:20:49 POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks 401
2026-11-13T19:23:30Z POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks/test 422
19:23:38 POST /workspaces/nope/outgoing-webhooks 422
2026-11-13T19:26:55Z → 20:06:30Z POST /workspaces/<workspace>/outgoing-webhooks/test 404 x23
      

The logs record the requests and response codes, but not their destinations or any resulting internal access. The SSRF interpretation follows the feature's URL-fetching behavior.

  • We trigger a shutdown of the whole platformWe triggered a platform-wide shutdown at 19:26 UTC, within minutes of observing access to some of Bitrise's own private GitHub repositories. It included backend systems, databases, secret access, all data centers and GitHub access. Previously issued credentials did not all stop working at that moment.Outcome: Shutdown triggeredEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record2 linesNovember 13, 19:26 UTC. Platform-wide shutdown was triggered within minutes once we observed access to some of Bitrise's own GitHub private repositories. The shutdown included: backend systems, databases, secret access, all data centers and GitHub access. The time and scope of the shutdown are from the responders' record.

We trigger a shutdown of the whole platform

We triggered a platform-wide shutdown at 19:26 UTC, within minutes of observing access to some of Bitrise's own private GitHub repositories. It included backend systems, databases, secret access, all data centers and GitHub access. Previously issued credentials did not all stop working at that moment.

Outcome: Shutdown triggeredEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        November 13, 19:26 UTC. Platform-wide shutdown was triggered within minutes once we observed access to some of Bitrise's own GitHub private repositories.
The shutdown included: backend systems, databases, secret access, all data centers and GitHub access.
      

The time and scope of the shutdown are from the responders' record.

  • We remove the bot's membership and lock its accountWe removed the dormant bot from the internal build-steps workspace at 19:26:43 UTC and locked its account at 19:34:38 UTC. This contained the entry account, but did not revoke credentials already copied from its workspace.Outcome: Bot access removedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceApplication database change history2 linesusers_roles <employee> Organization <workspace> member op=d 2026-11-13 19:26:43 users <employee> locked_at 2026-11-13 19:34:38 Selected membership-deletion and account-lock records with internal identifiers removed.

We remove the bot's membership and lock its account

We removed the dormant bot from the internal build-steps workspace at 19:26:43 UTC and locked its account at 19:34:38 UTC. This contained the entry account, but did not revoke credentials already copied from its workspace.

Outcome: Bot access removedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        users_roles <employee> Organization <workspace> member op=d 2026-11-13 19:26:43
users <employee> locked_at 2026-11-13 19:34:38
      

Selected membership-deletion and account-lock records with internal identifiers removed.

  • It uses an organization-wide key to reach 502 cloud projectsThe attacker began using an organization-wide infrastructure key created in 2022. It made 2,779 calls, with 2,183 successes, touching 502 cloud projects. Not every request in every project succeeded.Across multiple credentials, the attacker downloaded 236 production Terraform state files between 19:32 and 20:15 UTC. This began before this key's first recorded use, so the total is not attributed to this key alone. We treated every secret in those files as exposed and rotated it.Cloud monitoring counted 46 successful value-read requests to the cloud secret store by this identity in a production project from 20:16 to 20:28 UTC. Value-read audit records were unavailable there, leaving secret names and links to later credential use unproven. How the key was obtained is not established.2,183 / 2,779 successful / total calls502 cloud projects touched236 production state files across credentialsOutcome: Broad cloud reachEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert when one infrastructure identity enumerates hundreds of projects or begins reading production secrets and state from an external network.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)4 linesprincipal <service-account> key <key> (validAfter 2022-01-21T14:24:25Z) 2026-11-13T19:47:02.560 → 21:29:36.212 2779 calls, 2183 OK, 502 projects ListSecrets OK 250, storage.buckets.list OK 358 20:16 1, 20:17 3, 20:18 1, 20:19 6, 20:20 2, 20:21 2, 20:23 2 (+1x404), 20:27 20, 20:28 9 → 46 x HTTP 200 The final line counts AccessSecretVersion calls in cloud monitoring, not value-read audit records. The 236 state files span multiple credentials and must not be added to state-object operation counts.

It uses an organization-wide key to reach 502 cloud projects

The attacker began using an organization-wide infrastructure key created in 2022. It made 2,779 calls, with 2,183 successes, touching 502 cloud projects. Not every request in every project succeeded.

Across multiple credentials, the attacker downloaded 236 production Terraform state files between 19:32 and 20:15 UTC. This began before this key's first recorded use, so the total is not attributed to this key alone. We treated every secret in those files as exposed and rotated it.

Cloud monitoring counted 46 successful value-read requests to the cloud secret store by this identity in a production project from 20:16 to 20:28 UTC. Value-read audit records were unavailable there, leaving secret names and links to later credential use unproven. How the key was obtained is not established.

  • 2,183 / 2,779 successful / total calls
  • 502 cloud projects touched
  • 236 production state files across credentials

Outcome: Broad cloud reachEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert when one infrastructure identity enumerates hundreds of projects or begins reading production secrets and state from an external network.


        principal <service-account> key <key> (validAfter 2022-01-21T14:24:25Z)
2026-11-13T19:47:02.560 → 21:29:36.212 2779 calls, 2183 OK, 502 projects
ListSecrets OK 250, storage.buckets.list OK 358
20:16 1, 20:17 3, 20:18 1, 20:19 6, 20:20 2, 20:21 2, 20:23 2 (+1x404), 20:27 20, 20:28 9 → 46 x HTTP 200
      

The final line counts AccessSecretVersion calls in cloud monitoring, not value-read audit records. The 236 state files span multiple credentials and must not be added to state-object operation counts.

  • It uses more credentials to clone infrastructure repositoriesThe attacker used a second bot token, an internal GitHub App's private key and a machine deploy key to clone infrastructure repositories. It used the internal App to create an installation token, a credential scoped to one installation, before a clone. The final machine-key burst cloned ten repositories in about four minutes.Across the whole day, it cloned 28 private repositories, not 28 additional repositories in this interval. How each credential was obtained is not established.28 private repositories cloned all dayOutcome: Infrastructure code clonedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on installation-token creation outside backend networks and on machine identities cloning many infrastructure repositories in a short burst.EvidenceGitHub audit log export7 lines2026-11-13T19:52:26Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> (PAT classic) 2026-11-13T19:56:07Z GET /app 200 JWT <app> 74.211.97.xxx UA "recon" 2026-11-13T19:56:18Z POST /app/installations/<installation>/access_tokens 201 JWT <app> 2026-11-13T19:56:23Z GET /installation/repositories 200 INTEGRATION_SERVER_TO_SERVER 2026-11-13T19:58:14Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> (GitHub App server-to-server token) 2026-11-13T20:02:35Z / 20:23:46Z git.clone <service-account> <repo>, <repo> 2026-11-13T20:26:18Z → 20:30:23Z git.clone <service-account> ×10 (<repo>) GitHub masks the last IP octet; App IDs, token fragments, repository names and key fingerprints are omitted. This internal App is different from the Bitrise GitHub App used later.

It uses more credentials to clone infrastructure repositories

The attacker used a second bot token, an internal GitHub App's private key and a machine deploy key to clone infrastructure repositories. It used the internal App to create an installation token, a credential scoped to one installation, before a clone. The final machine-key burst cloned ten repositories in about four minutes.

Across the whole day, it cloned 28 private repositories, not 28 additional repositories in this interval. How each credential was obtained is not established.

  • 28 private repositories cloned all day

Outcome: Infrastructure code clonedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on installation-token creation outside backend networks and on machine identities cloning many infrastructure repositories in a short burst.


        2026-11-13T19:52:26Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> (PAT classic)
2026-11-13T19:56:07Z GET /app 200 JWT <app> 74.211.97.xxx UA "recon"
2026-11-13T19:56:18Z POST /app/installations/<installation>/access_tokens 201 JWT <app>
2026-11-13T19:56:23Z GET /installation/repositories 200 INTEGRATION_SERVER_TO_SERVER
2026-11-13T19:58:14Z git.clone <service-account> <repo> (GitHub App server-to-server token)
2026-11-13T20:02:35Z / 20:23:46Z git.clone <service-account> <repo>, <repo>
2026-11-13T20:26:18Z → 20:30:23Z git.clone <service-account> ×10 (<repo>)
      

GitHub masks the last IP octet; App IDs, token fragments, repository names and key fingerprints are omitted. This internal App is different from the Bitrise GitHub App used later.

  • We challenge and block requests at the edgeFrom 20:28 UTC, our edge began challenging 74.211.97.67, with 125 recorded challenges and two blocks. All requests to internal hostnames from 20:29 to 20:57 UTC were challenged. This enforced those routes, but did not revoke cloud keys or tokens at other providers.Outcome: Challenged and blockedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)1 line74.211.97.67 security_action: managed_challenge 125 (first 2026-11-13T20:28Z <internal-host> /readyz 403), block 2 The logs prove enforcement, not when a manual rule changed. Our records show all internal-hostname requests at 20:29–20:57 UTC as challenged.

We challenge and block requests at the edge

From 20:28 UTC, our edge began challenging 74.211.97.67, with 125 recorded challenges and two blocks. All requests to internal hostnames from 20:29 to 20:57 UTC were challenged. This enforced those routes, but did not revoke cloud keys or tokens at other providers.

Outcome: Challenged and blockedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        74.211.97.67 security_action: managed_challenge 125 (first 2026-11-13T20:28Z <internal-host> /readyz 403), block 2
      

The logs prove enforcement, not when a manual rule changed. Our records show all internal-hostname requests at 20:29–20:57 UTC as challenged.

  • We switch the platform offWe switched the platform off at 20:34 UTC, 68 minutes after starting the shutdown. Keys the attacker had already copied still worked directly against cloud and code-hosting services until each one was revoked.Outcome: Platform offEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record2 linesAt 19:26 UTC, we started shutting down our backend systems, database, secret access, all data centers, and GitHub access. We switched off the platform at 20:34 UTC. The times are from Bitrise's published preliminary review of Nov 18, 2026.

We switch the platform off

We switched the platform off at 20:34 UTC, 68 minutes after starting the shutdown. Keys the attacker had already copied still worked directly against cloud and code-hosting services until each one was revoked.

Outcome: Platform offEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        At 19:26 UTC, we started shutting down our backend systems, database, secret access, all data centers, and GitHub access.
We switched off the platform at 20:34 UTC.
      

The times are from Bitrise's published preliminary review of Nov 18, 2026.

  • It uses the Bitrise GitHub App key to create a tokenThe attacker used the Bitrise GitHub App's private key. The recorded sequence contains one installation listing, one token created for Bitrise's own installation and one repository listing. These are API operations, not a repository-clone count.The only period in which the attacker could have created access tokens for the Bitrise GitHub App was November 13, 20:46:15–20:53:12 UTC. Such a token is valid for at most one hour. We have no indication that any customer repository was accessed through the App. How the private key was obtained is not established.Outcome: App token createdEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on GitHub App private-key authentication and installation-token creation from addresses outside your backend networks.EvidenceGitHub audit log export4 lines2026-11-13T20:46:15Z GET /app 200 JWT <app> 74.211.97.xxx 2026-11-13T20:46:15Z GET /app/installations 200 JWT <app> 2026-11-13T20:46:38Z POST /app/installations/<installation>/access_tokens 201 JWT <app> 2026-11-13T20:46:53Z GET /installation/repositories 200 INTEGRATION_SERVER_TO_SERVER <app> The token-creation window and customer-impact assessment are from the responders' record. GitHub masks the final octet of the address in its export; identifiers are omitted.

It uses the Bitrise GitHub App key to create a token

The attacker used the Bitrise GitHub App's private key. The recorded sequence contains one installation listing, one token created for Bitrise's own installation and one repository listing. These are API operations, not a repository-clone count.

The only period in which the attacker could have created access tokens for the Bitrise GitHub App was November 13, 20:46:15–20:53:12 UTC. Such a token is valid for at most one hour. We have no indication that any customer repository was accessed through the App. How the private key was obtained is not established.

Outcome: App token createdEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on GitHub App private-key authentication and installation-token creation from addresses outside your backend networks.


        2026-11-13T20:46:15Z GET /app 200 JWT <app> 74.211.97.xxx
2026-11-13T20:46:15Z GET /app/installations 200 JWT <app>
2026-11-13T20:46:38Z POST /app/installations/<installation>/access_tokens 201 JWT <app>
2026-11-13T20:46:53Z GET /installation/repositories 200 INTEGRATION_SERVER_TO_SERVER <app>
      

The token-creation window and customer-impact assessment are from the responders' record. GitHub masks the final octet of the address in its export; identifiers are omitted.

  • We delete and replace the Bitrise GitHub App's private keyWe deleted the Bitrise GitHub App's private key at 20:53:12 UTC and replaced it, ending the period in which the attacker could create access tokens. An already-issued token is valid for at most one hour.Customers can check their own GitHub audit logs for activity by the Bitrise GitHub App from 74.211.97.67 between November 13, 20:46 and 21:53 UTC.Outcome: App key replacedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record3 linesThe only period in which the attacker could have created access tokens for the Bitrise GitHub App was 7 minutes on November 13: from 20:46:15 UTC until we deleted the App's private key at 20:53:12 UTC. A token of this kind is valid for at most one hour. The key was deleted at 20:53:12 UTC and replaced at 20:53 UTC; these times and the customer audit-log check are from the responders' record.

We delete and replace the Bitrise GitHub App's private key

We deleted the Bitrise GitHub App's private key at 20:53:12 UTC and replaced it, ending the period in which the attacker could create access tokens. An already-issued token is valid for at most one hour.

Customers can check their own GitHub audit logs for activity by the Bitrise GitHub App from 74.211.97.67 between November 13, 20:46 and 21:53 UTC.

Outcome: App key replacedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        The only period in which the attacker could have created access tokens for the Bitrise GitHub App was 7 minutes on November 13:
from 20:46:15 UTC until we deleted the App's private key at 20:53:12 UTC.
A token of this kind is valid for at most one hour.
      

The key was deleted at 20:53:12 UTC and replaced at 20:53 UTC; these times and the customer audit-log check are from the responders' record.

  • It lists a build-machine log bucket with a remaining keyThe attacker used a log-uploader key to list a bucket holding build-machine logs. The key made 676 calls, with 641 successes. Successful listings do not establish that the listed objects were downloaded. How the key was obtained is not established.641 successful callsOutcome: Log bucket listedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert when upload-only workflow identities enumerate their storage buckets from external networks or continue operating during credential containment.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)1 line<service-account> key <key> 2026-11-13T21:03:27.648 → 21:57:50.906 676 calls, 641 OK The row shows 676 calls, with 641 successes. These listings are separate from the archive downloads made with another identity.

It lists a build-machine log bucket with a remaining key

The attacker used a log-uploader key to list a bucket holding build-machine logs. The key made 676 calls, with 641 successes. Successful listings do not establish that the listed objects were downloaded. How the key was obtained is not established.

  • 641 successful calls

Outcome: Log bucket listedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert when upload-only workflow identities enumerate their storage buckets from external networks or continue operating during credential containment.


        <service-account> key <key> 2026-11-13T21:03:27.648 → 21:57:50.906 676 calls, 641 OK
      

The row shows 676 calls, with 641 successes. These listings are separate from the archive downloads made with another identity.

  • We delete the compromised GitHub deploy keysWe deleted the compromised GitHub deploy keys at 21:08 UTC. These were separate credentials from the Bitrise GitHub App's private key.Outcome: Deploy keys deletedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.EvidenceResponders' incident record1 line21:08 compromised GitHub deploy keys deleted (<employee>, <employee>). The response action is from the responders' record; no deploy-key deletion audit row is shown.

We delete the compromised GitHub deploy keys

We deleted the compromised GitHub deploy keys at 21:08 UTC. These were separate credentials from the Bitrise GitHub App's private key.

Outcome: Deploy keys deletedEvidence grade: ReportedA response action taken from the responders’ record.


        21:08 compromised GitHub deploy keys deleted (<employee>, <employee>).
      

The response action is from the responders' record; no deploy-key deletion audit row is shown.

  • It downloads 1,535 build-machine log archivesThe attacker downloaded 1,535 build-machine log archives during the response. These were separate from the earlier API build-log reads and the log-uploader key's bucket listings.1,535 build-machine log archivesOutcome: Machine logs downloadedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on bulk reads from build-machine log storage, including activity continuing through a key-disable operation.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)1 linestorage.objects.get OK 1551 (<bucket> 12 @ 20:14:56–20:15:39, <bucket> 1539 @ 21:15:58–21:29:36) The row counts 1,539 successful read operations on the archive bucket; our records count 1,535 distinct archives downloaded. Operations and archives measure different things.

It downloads 1,535 build-machine log archives

The attacker downloaded 1,535 build-machine log archives during the response. These were separate from the earlier API build-log reads and the log-uploader key's bucket listings.

  • 1,535 build-machine log archives

Outcome: Machine logs downloadedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on bulk reads from build-machine log storage, including activity continuing through a key-disable operation.


        storage.objects.get OK 1551 (<bucket> 12 @ 20:14:56–20:15:39, <bucket> 1539 @ 21:15:58–21:29:36)
      

The row counts 1,539 successful read operations on the archive bucket; our records count 1,535 distinct archives downloaded. Operations and archives measure different things.

  • We disable the key, but issued tokens keep workingWe disabled the organization-wide infrastructure key at 21:22:11 UTC. Access tokens already issued through it continued working until 21:29:36 UTC.Outcome: Infrastructure key disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)2 linesAdmin Activity: 2026-11-13T21:22:11Z DisableServiceAccountKey <key> by <employee> 2026-11-13T19:47:02.560 → 21:29:36.212 2779 calls, 2183 OK, 502 projects The disable operation is directly logged. Later successful activity is recorded under the same identity; our records identify already-issued access tokens as the reason it continued.

We disable the key, but issued tokens keep working

We disabled the organization-wide infrastructure key at 21:22:11 UTC. Access tokens already issued through it continued working until 21:29:36 UTC.

Outcome: Infrastructure key disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        Admin Activity: 2026-11-13T21:22:11Z DisableServiceAccountKey <key> by <employee>
2026-11-13T19:47:02.560 → 21:29:36.212 2779 calls, 2183 OK, 502 projects
      

The disable operation is directly logged. Later successful activity is recorded under the same identity; our records identify already-issued access tokens as the reason it continued.

  • We disable the metrics key after its recorded calls are deniedWe disabled the metrics-publishing key at 21:38:39 UTC. It had been taken from a build machine in the previous chapter. The attacker had tried it again 50 times between 16:44:22.757 and 19:53:34.334 UTC. Every recorded call in that interval was denied.Outcome: Metrics key disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)2 lines2026-11-13T16:44:22.757 2026-11-13T19:53:34.334 50 0 74.211.97.67 2026-11-13T21:38:39Z DisableServiceAccountKey by <employee> from <responder-address> The first row counts recorded calls and successful calls for the metrics identity. It does not cover unlogged metrics-publishing operations.

We disable the metrics key after its recorded calls are denied

We disabled the metrics-publishing key at 21:38:39 UTC. It had been taken from a build machine in the previous chapter. The attacker had tried it again 50 times between 16:44:22.757 and 19:53:34.334 UTC. Every recorded call in that interval was denied.

Outcome: Metrics key disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        2026-11-13T16:44:22.757 2026-11-13T19:53:34.334 50 0 74.211.97.67
2026-11-13T21:38:39Z DisableServiceAccountKey by <employee> from <responder-address>
      

The first row counts recorded calls and successful calls for the metrics identity. It does not cover unlogged metrics-publishing operations.

  • It makes its last recorded successful cloud API callThe remaining log-uploader key made the last successful cloud API call recorded from the attacker's addresses at 21:57:50 UTC. Later attempts with other keys were denied. This marks the last observed cloud success, not the end of requests or proof that every access path was visible.Outcome: Last recorded successEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisContinue monitoring denied credential use after the last success, keeping separate timelines for cloud APIs, application access and edge blocks.EvidenceCloud audit logs (Google Cloud)2 linesLatest successful non-anonymous call from any attacker IP: 2026-11-13T21:57:50.906 Denied after 21:30: <service-account> (23/24, 0 OK), <service-account> (0 OK), <service-account> (13, 0 OK) The audit-log timestamp has subsecond precision and falls within the 21:57:50 UTC second. Later denied attempts are not evidence that requests ceased.

It makes its last recorded successful cloud API call

The remaining log-uploader key made the last successful cloud API call recorded from the attacker's addresses at 21:57:50 UTC. Later attempts with other keys were denied. This marks the last observed cloud success, not the end of requests or proof that every access path was visible.

Outcome: Last recorded successEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisContinue monitoring denied credential use after the last success, keeping separate timelines for cloud APIs, application access and edge blocks.


        Latest successful non-anonymous call from any attacker IP: 2026-11-13T21:57:50.906
Denied after 21:30: <service-account> (23/24, 0 OK), <service-account> (0 OK), <service-account> (13, 0 OK)
      

The audit-log timestamp has subsecond precision and falls within the 21:57:50 UTC second. Later denied attempts are not evidence that requests ceased.

  • It keeps checking its tokens, but the API blocks every checkFrom 02:15 UTC, 74.211.97.67 checked the API every 15–40 minutes, then loaded a sign-in page outside the edge protection. The API checks returned HTTP 403. No login attempt was recorded in this overnight pattern.Across Nov 14, the address sent 1,544 requests. Of these, 357 received HTTP 403 on api.bitrise.io. About 600 targeted the URL-fetching service and returned HTTP 400 or 503. Loading a public sign-in page did not restore access.1,544 requests on Nov 14357 HTTP 403 API responsesabout 600 HTTP 400/503 URL-fetching responsesOutcome: Checks blockedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on edge logs showing repeated blocked token checks followed by sign-in-page loads from the same source after containment.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)2 lines74.211.97.67 2026-11-14 first 02:15Z GET api.bitrise.io /v0.1/me 403 curl/7.88.1 Every 15–40 minutes overnight: a token check on the API (blocked), then the sign-in page on a host <edge protection> didn't cover. No login attempt. The second line is the request-log summary; the daily totals include later activity, not just the overnight checks.

It keeps checking its tokens, but the API blocks every check

From 02:15 UTC, 74.211.97.67 checked the API every 15–40 minutes, then loaded a sign-in page outside the edge protection. The API checks returned HTTP 403. No login attempt was recorded in this overnight pattern.

Across Nov 14, the address sent 1,544 requests. Of these, 357 received HTTP 403 on api.bitrise.io. About 600 targeted the URL-fetching service and returned HTTP 400 or 503. Loading a public sign-in page did not restore access.

  • 1,544 requests on Nov 14
  • 357 HTTP 403 API responses
  • about 600 HTTP 400/503 URL-fetching responses

Outcome: Checks blockedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on edge logs showing repeated blocked token checks followed by sign-in-page loads from the same source after containment.


        74.211.97.67 2026-11-14 first 02:15Z GET api.bitrise.io /v0.1/me 403 curl/7.88.1
Every 15–40 minutes overnight: a token check on the API (blocked), then the sign-in page on a host <edge protection> didn't cover. No login attempt.
      

The second line is the request-log summary; the daily totals include later activity, not just the overnight checks.

  • We expire its account token and disable its appsAt 07:10:05 UTC, we expired the long-lived token on the attacker’s account. At 08:35:58 UTC, we disabled its apps.Outcome: Token and apps disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.EvidenceApplication database change history1 lineuser_auth_tokens <token> (uid <attacker-account>) expire_at → 2026-11-14 07:10:05 ; repositories <app>/<app>/<app> last change 2026-11-14 08:35:58 The database records the token expiration and app changes at these two times. These actions did not mark the end of the attacker’s activity.

We expire its account token and disable its apps

At 07:10:05 UTC, we expired the long-lived token on the attacker’s account. At 08:35:58 UTC, we disabled its apps.

Outcome: Token and apps disabledEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.


        user_auth_tokens <token> (uid <attacker-account>) expire_at → 2026-11-14 07:10:05 ; repositories <app>/<app>/<app> last change 2026-11-14 08:35:58
      

The database records the token expiration and app changes at these two times. These actions did not mark the end of the attacker’s activity.

  • It tries two routes to the deployment controller; both refuse accessThe attacker tried an internal deployment controller through the edge at 11:35–11:53 UTC. It then tried an identity-checking access proxy at 13:45–14:01 UTC. Both routes refused access. The second burst contained 12 requests, all redirected by the proxy before reaching the controller.12 requests stopped at the proxyOutcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisCorrelate edge-log denials with later access-proxy requests for the same internal service from the same source.EvidenceLoad-balancer request logs2 lines74.211.97.67 → <internal-host>, 12 requests 2026-11-14T13:45:42–14:01:36, all 302 handled_by_<access-proxy> <internal-host> on 11-14, through <edge> (11:35–11:53) and <access-proxy> (13:45–14:01): all refused. The first line is the load-balancer record; the second summarizes both routes from the responders' record.

It tries two routes to the deployment controller; both refuse access

The attacker tried an internal deployment controller through the edge at 11:35–11:53 UTC. It then tried an identity-checking access proxy at 13:45–14:01 UTC. Both routes refused access. The second burst contained 12 requests, all redirected by the proxy before reaching the controller.

  • 12 requests stopped at the proxy

Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisCorrelate edge-log denials with later access-proxy requests for the same internal service from the same source.


        74.211.97.67 → <internal-host>, 12 requests 2026-11-14T13:45:42–14:01:36, all 302 handled_by_<access-proxy>
<internal-host> on 11-14, through <edge> (11:35–11:53) and <access-proxy> (13:45–14:01): all refused.
      

The first line is the load-balancer record; the second summarizes both routes from the responders' record.

  • It makes the URL-fetching service contact cloud metadata againThe attacker retried SSRF, making a server fetch a URL of its choosing. In the 12:00 UTC hourly metric bucket, the URL-fetching service contacted 169.254.169.254: one response was HTTP 200, two were 403 and three were 404. A request to metadata.google.internal received 403. Whether anything sensitive came back is not established.At 13:00:00 UTC, the test path /nope-1774 reached our edge from our own egress address with Go-http-client/2.0, returning 404. This showed the server fetching the attacker’s chosen path. We took the service offline that day.Outcome: Response unknownEvidence grade: Not establishedWe could not prove this with the data available.How to catch thisAlert on application egress logs showing metadata-address requests and edge logs showing attacker test paths arriving from your own egress address.EvidenceCloud monitoring metrics3 lines2026-11-14T12:00 egress_169.254.169.254 200 x1, 403 x2, 404 x3 2026-11-14T12:00 egress_metadata.google.internal 403 x1 2026-11-14T13:00:00Z <our-own-egress> GET <internal-host> /nope-1774 404 Go-http-client/2.0 Metadata times identify an hourly metric bucket, not exact request times; neither requested paths nor response bodies are recorded. The third line proves the test-path fetch; the service shutdown time is not recorded.

It makes the URL-fetching service contact cloud metadata again

The attacker retried SSRF, making a server fetch a URL of its choosing. In the 12:00 UTC hourly metric bucket, the URL-fetching service contacted 169.254.169.254: one response was HTTP 200, two were 403 and three were 404. A request to metadata.google.internal received 403. Whether anything sensitive came back is not established.

At 13:00:00 UTC, the test path /nope-1774 reached our edge from our own egress address with Go-http-client/2.0, returning 404. This showed the server fetching the attacker’s chosen path. We took the service offline that day.

Outcome: Response unknownEvidence grade: Not establishedWe could not prove this with the data available.

How to catch thisAlert on application egress logs showing metadata-address requests and edge logs showing attacker test paths arriving from your own egress address.


        2026-11-14T12:00  egress_169.254.169.254          200 x1, 403 x2, 404 x3
2026-11-14T12:00  egress_metadata.google.internal 403 x1
2026-11-14T13:00:00Z <our-own-egress> GET <internal-host> /nope-1774 404 Go-http-client/2.0
      

Metadata times identify an hourly metric bucket, not exact request times; neither requested paths nor response bodies are recorded. The third line proves the test-path fetch; the service shutdown time is not recorded.

  • It retries a stolen token and gets refused againAt 12:49 and 13:07 UTC, the attacker tried a stolen personal access token three times in the query string. All three requests returned HTTP 401.At 14:17 UTC, 118.100.234.120, the Kuala Lumpur address used earlier in the attack, returned for six requests. Responses were HTTP 403 or 302: blocks or redirects, not successful reads.Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisWatch application logs for rejected query-string credentials and edge logs for renewed requests from previously linked attacker addresses.EvidenceApplication request logs2 linesA stolen PAT tried 3× in the query string (12:49, 13:07; 401). 118.100.234.120 2026-11-14 14:17Z: GET api.bitrise.io / 403 ; GET <internal-host> / 302 The first line summarizes application logs; the second is an edge-log record.

It retries a stolen token and gets refused again

At 12:49 and 13:07 UTC, the attacker tried a stolen personal access token three times in the query string. All three requests returned HTTP 401.

At 14:17 UTC, 118.100.234.120, the Kuala Lumpur address used earlier in the attack, returned for six requests. Responses were HTTP 403 or 302: blocks or redirects, not successful reads.

Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisWatch application logs for rejected query-string credentials and edge logs for renewed requests from previously linked attacker addresses.


        A stolen PAT tried 3× in the query string (12:49, 13:07; 401).
118.100.234.120 2026-11-14 14:17Z: GET api.bitrise.io / 403 ; GET <internal-host> / 302
      

The first line summarizes application logs; the second is an edge-log record.

  • An account signs up, but its workspace creation failsAt 16:28:53 UTC, an account signed up through Google as [email protected] from 74.82.199.230. The only link to the attack is a correlation: this address and 74.211.97.67 share the hosting provider Cluster Logic Inc.Workspace creation failed three times with HTTP 500 between 16:28:54 and 16:29:24 UTC. No further activity was seen in this session. The account was locked at 20:19:30 UTC.Outcome: Workspace creation failedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisReview sign-up logs for accounts from a blocked source’s hosting provider, but do not treat provider overlap alone as proof.EvidenceApplication database change history3 linesuid <attacker-account> [email protected] created 2026-11-14 16:28:53 ip 74.82.199.230 ; identities: provider google uid <identity> 16:28:54–16:29:24 GET /create-workspace - 500 (x3) WHOIS 74.82.199.230 and 74.211.97.67: OrgName Cluster Logic Inc, NetName CL-1210 The sign-up is recorded in database history; workspace errors come from application logs and the provider match from network registration.

An account signs up, but its workspace creation fails

At 16:28:53 UTC, an account signed up through Google as [email protected] from 74.82.199.230. The only link to the attack is a correlation: this address and 74.211.97.67 share the hosting provider Cluster Logic Inc.

Workspace creation failed three times with HTTP 500 between 16:28:54 and 16:29:24 UTC. No further activity was seen in this session. The account was locked at 20:19:30 UTC.

Outcome: Workspace creation failedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisReview sign-up logs for accounts from a blocked source’s hosting provider, but do not treat provider overlap alone as proof.


        uid <attacker-account> [email protected] created 2026-11-14 16:28:53 ip 74.82.199.230 ; identities: provider google uid <identity>
16:28:54–16:29:24 GET /create-workspace - 500 (x3)
WHOIS 74.82.199.230 and 74.211.97.67: OrgName Cluster Logic Inc, NetName CL-1210
      

The sign-up is recorded in database history; workspace errors come from application logs and the provider match from network registration.

  • It requests control-plane credentials by name and gets refusedAt 19:02–19:09 UTC, the attacker requested an internal certificate authority’s certificate chain, client certificate and access token by exact name. It used a key from outside our organization. The requests were denied. Across Nov 13–14, that key made 70 cloud calls with no successes. The names appear in the stolen Terraform state, files describing deployed infrastructure. We infer that those files told it where to look.At 19:15–19:21 UTC, it probed a device-management service with an already-rotated token. It fetched an enrollment profile, but device and command-queue API requests were refused. Fetching the profile did not establish control of devices.70 cloud calls on Nov 13–14; zero successesOutcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit logs showing exact-name requests for control-plane credentials listed in infrastructure state, especially from keys outside your organization.EvidenceResponders' incident record4 lines<service-account>@<project> 2026-11-13T13:00:54 → 2026-11-14T19:09:56 70 calls, 0 OK <internal-PKI> on 11-14 (19:02–19:09): CA chain, client cert and ACL token requested by exact name with an out-of-org key, all denied. The names fit the stolen Terraform state. <device-management-service> on 11-14 (19:15–19:21): enrolment profile fetched, device and enqueue APIs tried with an already-rotated token. The record shows credential requests, denials and an enrollment-profile fetch. The 70-call total covers Nov 13–14, not just the 19:02–19:09 requests.

It requests control-plane credentials by name and gets refused

At 19:02–19:09 UTC, the attacker requested an internal certificate authority’s certificate chain, client certificate and access token by exact name. It used a key from outside our organization. The requests were denied. Across Nov 13–14, that key made 70 cloud calls with no successes. The names appear in the stolen Terraform state, files describing deployed infrastructure. We infer that those files told it where to look.

At 19:15–19:21 UTC, it probed a device-management service with an already-rotated token. It fetched an enrollment profile, but device and command-queue API requests were refused. Fetching the profile did not establish control of devices.

  • 70 cloud calls on Nov 13–14; zero successes

Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit logs showing exact-name requests for control-plane credentials listed in infrastructure state, especially from keys outside your organization.


        <service-account>@<project>  2026-11-13T13:00:54 → 2026-11-14T19:09:56  70 calls, 0 OK
<internal-PKI> on 11-14 (19:02–19:09): CA chain, client cert and ACL token requested by exact name with an out-of-org key, all denied.
The names fit the stolen Terraform state.
<device-management-service> on 11-14 (19:15–19:21): enrolment profile fetched, device and enqueue APIs tried with an already-rotated token.
      

The record shows credential requests, denials and an enrollment-profile fetch. The 70-call total covers Nov 13–14, not just the 19:02–19:09 requests.

  • It gets a public diagnostic response, not renewed accessThe attacker’s last event in application logs was at 19:45:25 UTC. Its last edge request was at 19:47 UTC: /cdn-cgi/trace with curl/8.7.1, answered HTTP 200. This public diagnostic response did not show renewed access to sensitive resources.The last successful cloud API call recorded from the attacker’s addresses remained at 21:57:50 UTC on Nov 13.Outcome: Public response onlyEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisTrack last-seen requests in application and edge logs separately from successful cloud audit operations; public HTTP 200 responses do not prove sensitive access.EvidenceEdge request logs (CDN/WAF)2 linesLast attacker event in our logs 19:45:25; last sighting in <edge> 19:47. last 19:47Z GET <internal-host> /cdn-cgi/trace 200 curl/8.7.1 The application-log cutoff is from the responders' record; the edge log records the later public request.

It gets a public diagnostic response, not renewed access

The attacker’s last event in application logs was at 19:45:25 UTC. Its last edge request was at 19:47 UTC: /cdn-cgi/trace with curl/8.7.1, answered HTTP 200. This public diagnostic response did not show renewed access to sensitive resources.

The last successful cloud API call recorded from the attacker’s addresses remained at 21:57:50 UTC on Nov 13.

Outcome: Public response onlyEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisTrack last-seen requests in application and edge logs separately from successful cloud audit operations; public HTTP 200 responses do not prove sensitive access.


        Last attacker event in our logs 19:45:25; last sighting in <edge> 19:47.
last 19:47Z GET <internal-host> /cdn-cgi/trace 200 curl/8.7.1
      

The application-log cutoff is from the responders' record; the edge log records the later public request.

  • It returns with the accounts and cloud key; access is refusedThe attacker returned from 118.100.234.120. At 20:24:10 UTC, it tried listing the bucket holding our Apple signing files without credentials, using curl/7.88.1. Google Cloud denied the request.It loaded the sign-in page, then tried the bot account and its original account, auwiqns. Both sign-ins returned HTTP 401, as did token checks. At 20:31:27–20:31:43 UTC, it tried a cloud key stolen on Nov 13, then no credentials, against signing-file buckets and an internal CI storage bucket. All those cloud requests were denied.Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisCorrelate cloud audit denials for key replay and anonymous bucket requests with application-log sign-in failures from the same source.EvidenceResponders' incident record4 lines["20:24:10", null, "gcp", "First event. No credentials: lists <bucket> (curl/7.88.1)", "denied", "denied", 1], ["20:26:07", null, "web", "Sign-in as the bot <bot-account>", "401", "rejected"], ["20:26:35", null, "web", "Sign-in as its original account auwiqns", "401", "rejected"], ["20:31:27", "20:31:43", "gcp", "Uses the <cloud-key>, then no credentials: lists both Apple certificate/profile buckets and <bucket>", "denied", "denied", 1], Redacted rows from the combined cloud and application event log.

It returns with the accounts and cloud key; access is refused

The attacker returned from 118.100.234.120. At 20:24:10 UTC, it tried listing the bucket holding our Apple signing files without credentials, using curl/7.88.1. Google Cloud denied the request.

It loaded the sign-in page, then tried the bot account and its original account, auwiqns. Both sign-ins returned HTTP 401, as did token checks. At 20:31:27–20:31:43 UTC, it tried a cloud key stolen on Nov 13, then no credentials, against signing-file buckets and an internal CI storage bucket. All those cloud requests were denied.

Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisCorrelate cloud audit denials for key replay and anonymous bucket requests with application-log sign-in failures from the same source.


        ["20:24:10", null, "gcp", "First event. No credentials: lists <bucket> (curl/7.88.1)", "denied", "denied", 1],
["20:26:07", null, "web", "Sign-in as the bot <bot-account>", "401", "rejected"],
["20:26:35", null, "web", "Sign-in as its original account auwiqns", "401", "rejected"],
["20:31:27", "20:31:43", "gcp", "Uses the <cloud-key>, then no credentials: lists both Apple certificate/profile buckets and <bucket>", "denied", "denied", 1],
      

Redacted rows from the combined cloud and application event log.

  • It retries secret reads and a build trigger; all are refusedThe attacker used the stolen cloud key to ask Secret Manager to list secrets in four production projects. Every request was denied. It also requested an internal documentation-site app’s details, secrets, build certificates, provisioning profiles and a build trigger. These returned HTTP 401, 404 or 400. A request for a cloud-key secret in the internal build-steps workspace returned 404.Token checks kept failing. Three requests ended with HTTP 499 because the attacker’s client gave up waiting on responses we were deliberately slowing. Public sign-in pages still loaded, but did not provide access to the resources it tried to read.Outcome: Requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit and application logs showing a blocked source replaying known app identifiers and secret names.EvidenceResponders' incident record4 lines["20:41:46", "20:44:23", "api", "/v0.1/me; 3× 499: it gave up on slowed responses", "401", "rejected"], ["20:44:38", "20:44:39", "gcp", "<cloud-key>: Secret Manager ListSecrets in <project>, <project>, <project>, <project>", "denied", "denied", 1], ["20:56:20", "20:57:49", "api", "<app> app: details, build certificates, provisioning profiles", "401", "rejected"], ["20:57:31", "20:58:27", "web", "<app> build/start.json, 3× (2× with no parameters)", "400 / 401", "rejected"], Redacted event-log rows; HTTP 499 records the abandoned requests, not a successful response. The cloud-key secret request occurred earlier, at 20:27:34 UTC.

It retries secret reads and a build trigger; all are refused

The attacker used the stolen cloud key to ask Secret Manager to list secrets in four production projects. Every request was denied. It also requested an internal documentation-site app’s details, secrets, build certificates, provisioning profiles and a build trigger. These returned HTTP 401, 404 or 400. A request for a cloud-key secret in the internal build-steps workspace returned 404.

Token checks kept failing. Three requests ended with HTTP 499 because the attacker’s client gave up waiting on responses we were deliberately slowing. Public sign-in pages still loaded, but did not provide access to the resources it tried to read.

Outcome: Requests refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit and application logs showing a blocked source replaying known app identifiers and secret names.


        ["20:41:46", "20:44:23", "api", "/v0.1/me; 3× 499: it gave up on slowed responses", "401", "rejected"],
["20:44:38", "20:44:39", "gcp", "<cloud-key>: Secret Manager ListSecrets in <project>, <project>, <project>, <project>", "denied", "denied", 1],
["20:56:20", "20:57:49", "api", "<app> app: details, build certificates, provisioning profiles", "401", "rejected"],
["20:57:31", "20:58:27", "web", "<app> build/start.json, 3× (2× with no parameters)", "400 / 401", "rejected"],
      

Redacted event-log rows; HTTP 499 records the abandoned requests, not a successful response. The cloud-key secret request occurred earlier, at 20:27:34 UTC.

  • It creates i3694canary, but its requests are refusedThe attacker opened the reopened sign-up page twice and created i3694canary at 21:05:01 UTC with a new personal Gmail address. Its app-list and API-token requests returned HTTP 401. Using its own new user ID as a workspace ID returned 404.The account never confirmed its email, never signed in and was banned. Its name correlates with ARTEX’s pattern of i<number> task IDs appearing in the names of things its agents create. We withhold the email address because nothing shows the attacker controlled that mailbox.Outcome: Sign-up onlyEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.How to catch thisWatch application logs for accounts from known attacker sources whose first requests target tokens, app lists or workspace identifiers.EvidenceResponders' incident record4 lines["21:05:01", null, "web", "Creates a new account, i3694canary (new personal Gmail address)", "created", "success", 1], ["21:05:20", null, "web", "App list", "401", "rejected"], ["21:05:39", null, "web", "Its own new user ID (<attacker-user-id>) tried as a workspace ID", "404", "rejected"], ["21:05:58", null, "web", "Its own API tokens", "401", "rejected"] Account activity is recorded directly. The naming comparison is with the public ARTEX source code: its workers use directories named after task IDs, and the things they create carry that prefix.

It creates i3694canary, but its requests are refused

The attacker opened the reopened sign-up page twice and created i3694canary at 21:05:01 UTC with a new personal Gmail address. Its app-list and API-token requests returned HTTP 401. Using its own new user ID as a workspace ID returned 404.

The account never confirmed its email, never signed in and was banned. Its name correlates with ARTEX’s pattern of i<number> task IDs appearing in the names of things its agents create. We withhold the email address because nothing shows the attacker controlled that mailbox.

Outcome: Sign-up onlyEvidence grade: CorrelatedEach fact is verified; the link between them is inferred from timing or fingerprints.

How to catch thisWatch application logs for accounts from known attacker sources whose first requests target tokens, app lists or workspace identifiers.


        ["21:05:01", null, "web", "Creates a new account, i3694canary (new personal Gmail address)", "created", "success", 1],
["21:05:20", null, "web", "App list", "401", "rejected"],
["21:05:39", null, "web", "Its own new user ID (<attacker-user-id>) tried as a workspace ID", "404", "rejected"],
["21:05:58", null, "web", "Its own API tokens", "401", "rejected"]
      

Account activity is recorded directly. The naming comparison is with the public ARTEX source code: its workers use directories named after task IDs, and the things they create carry that prefix.

  • It requests a Terraform state file by path and is refusedAfter more rejected app-list requests, the attacker requested a service-account Terraform state object in our infrastructure state bucket without credentials. Between 21:18:00 and 21:18:52 UTC, two read attempts and two list attempts were denied.Another /v0.1/apps request returned HTTP 401 at 21:19:17 UTC. The last recorded event was a public GET / at 21:19:55 UTC, answered with a 302 redirect.Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit logs showing anonymous requests for infrastructure state by exact path, especially from a source that previously accessed infrastructure inventory.EvidenceResponders' incident record3 lines["21:18:00", "21:18:52", "gcp", "No credentials: <bucket>/<state-object-path>, 2× read, 2× list", "denied", "denied", 1], ["21:19:17", null, "api", "/v0.1/apps", "401", "rejected"], ["21:19:55", null, "web", "GET /: last event", "302", "neutral", 1] The exact internal bucket and object path are generalized; operation counts and times are preserved.

It requests a Terraform state file by path and is refused

After more rejected app-list requests, the attacker requested a service-account Terraform state object in our infrastructure state bucket without credentials. Between 21:18:00 and 21:18:52 UTC, two read attempts and two list attempts were denied.

Another /v0.1/apps request returned HTTP 401 at 21:19:17 UTC. The last recorded event was a public GET / at 21:19:55 UTC, answered with a 302 redirect.

Outcome: Access refusedEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisAlert on cloud audit logs showing anonymous requests for infrastructure state by exact path, especially from a source that previously accessed infrastructure inventory.


        ["21:18:00", "21:18:52", "gcp", "No credentials: <bucket>/<state-object-path>, 2× read, 2× list", "denied", "denied", 1],
["21:19:17", null, "api", "/v0.1/apps", "401", "rejected"],
["21:19:55", null, "web", "GET /: last event", "302", "neutral", 1]
      

The exact internal bucket and object path are generalized; operation counts and times are preserved.

  • It makes no successful reads during the 55-minute sessionThe recorded session ran from 20:24:10 to 21:19:55 UTC: 55 minutes. All 19 Google Cloud requests were denied. Nine sign-in attempts on the two old accounts were all rejected (HTTP 401 or 422). There were zero successful reads of secrets, buckets or apps. The only action that worked was a sign-up: i3694canary never confirmed its email, never signed in and was banned.Our visibility has limits: edge exports omit allowed traffic to hosts without their own logs, some cloud projects returned collection errors, and a group of system projects was outside the search. We keep monitoring.19 Google Cloud requests denied9 old-account sign-in attempts, all rejected0 successful secret, bucket or app readsOutcome: Zero successful readsEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.How to catch thisMeasure post-containment successes and failures across identity, application and cloud logs, and retain explicit gaps in collection coverage.EvidenceResponders' incident record6 lines55 minactive, 20:24:10–21:19:55 0successful reads of secrets, buckets or apps 19Google Cloud requests, all denied 1new account created (i3694canary) 401Its original account auwiqns (<attacker-account>) and the bot <bot-account> (<bot-account-id>): 9 sign-in attempts. Never confirmed its email and never signed in; now banned. These session totals are not counts of chart rows; one row can cover several requests. Five of the nine sign-in attempts, as auwiqns at 20:51:21–20:53:50 UTC, returned HTTP 401 or 422.

It makes no successful reads during the 55-minute session

The recorded session ran from 20:24:10 to 21:19:55 UTC: 55 minutes. All 19 Google Cloud requests were denied. Nine sign-in attempts on the two old accounts were all rejected (HTTP 401 or 422). There were zero successful reads of secrets, buckets or apps. The only action that worked was a sign-up: i3694canary never confirmed its email, never signed in and was banned.

Our visibility has limits: edge exports omit allowed traffic to hosts without their own logs, some cloud projects returned collection errors, and a group of system projects was outside the search. We keep monitoring.

  • 19 Google Cloud requests denied
  • 9 old-account sign-in attempts, all rejected
  • 0 successful secret, bucket or app reads

Outcome: Zero successful readsEvidence grade: VerifiedShown directly by a log record.

How to catch thisMeasure post-containment successes and failures across identity, application and cloud logs, and retain explicit gaps in collection coverage.


        55 minactive, 20:24:10–21:19:55
0successful reads of secrets, buckets or apps
19Google Cloud requests, all denied
1new account created (i3694canary)
401Its original account auwiqns (<attacker-account>) and the bot <bot-account> (<bot-account-id>): 9 sign-in attempts.
Never confirmed its email and never signed in; now banned.
      

These session totals are not counts of chart rows; one row can cover several requests. Five of the nine sign-in attempts, as auwiqns at 20:51:21–20:53:50 UTC, returned HTTP 401 or 422.

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