
"Right now, nobody dares to order futures." Cheng Lin, who handles GPU procurement in Shenzhen, summed up this year's situation in a single sentence.
From his sudden resignation, to talk of a return, to his own public expression of a desire to come back while the board made clear on an earnings call that it had no intention of reinstating him—in just five days, word surrounding 黄仁勋's fate reversed several times.
Multiple sources had also previously told Leiphone that 黄仁勋 would find it difficult to retake the helm of 英伟达 in the short term.
But for Chinese computing power service providers whose business depends on 英伟达 GPUs, the more pressing question right now is: even if 黄仁勋 comes back, can high-end GPUs still be bought? And once bought, how should they be monetized?
Domestic channels for buying 英伟达 GPUs are narrowing, and renting computing power overseas is no easy matter either. Cheng Lin's team has tried to secure computing resources through self-building and investing in overseas data centers, but data center construction takes two to three years. As the U.S. tightens oversight of the flow of advanced GPUs, some projects under construction have begun to be reassessed.
Another path he considered—Huawei's Ascend 950—has, to his understanding, already filled its current order schedule, and delivery timelines are likewise uncertain.
黄仁勋 Wants to Do Business in China
But the U.S. Is Tightening Every Path
"If doing business can make money, why wouldn't (黄仁勋) push for the U.S. government to relax controls?" computing power service provider Jason Lee said bluntly.
But today, 黄仁勋's commercial ambitions are colliding head-on with the U.S.'s steadily tightening chip controls on China.
Since last year, U.S. lawmakers have pushed four bills targeting advanced chip exports and transfers, covering export approval, chip location verification, export controls on allied semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and regulation of remote access to controlled chips and other products through cloud services and similar means.
At present, some lawmakers from both parties in Congress are pushing to include these bills in the final text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2027. At the current pace, the NDAA could reach a floor vote as early as December this year.
U.S. regulation of advanced AI chips is extending to the transfer of equipment after export, which is also why Jason judges that 黄仁勋's departure will have limited impact.
"Whether or not 黄仁勋 continues as CEO, it won't change the direction of the U.S. tightening GPU supply to China," Jason noted, adding that this reflects U.S. concerns about China's AI capabilities and is tied to the broader tech competition between China and the U.S.
Chip industry analyst Xiao Du said bluntly that even 黄仁勋 himself probably did not fully anticipate that AI would develop so rapidly in just a few years, gradually rising from an ordinary industrial technology to a strategic capability closely tied to national security.
Many interviewees believe the risk was bound to arrive sooner or later; they just didn't expect 黄仁勋 to become the first target.
In Xiao Du's view, compared with 英伟达, other chip companies already had incentives to compete for the Chinese market but have been relatively cautious in their China business. 英伟达 under 黄仁勋's leadership, however, was more aggressive—even, to some extent, "feigning ignorance while knowing full well."
Xiao Du added: "Although many domestic companies take part in the high-end GPU supply business, the teams that truly control the core channels and resources are really just a handful of people." That means if the U.S. wants to investigate, it can easily follow the trail and map out the entire chain of interests.
So whether 黄仁勋's past aggressive approach in the Chinese market will invite further accountability ultimately depends on how far the U.S. government is willing to push regulation.
Under this broader trend, 英伟达's own compliance management has clearly been stepped up as well.
On one hand, even before 黄仁勋 resigned, foreign media reported that 英伟达 had begun requiring some customers in Southeast Asia seeking qualification as its cloud partners to connect to the Fleet Intelligence system, which can collect information such as the deployment locations of AI accelerators.
On the other hand, 英伟达 recently established a dedicated committee under its board for the first time, focused on overseeing national security and chip export control matters.
A Single B300 Priced Up to 22 Million Yuan: Huge Profits and Defaults in Gray Channels
Changes at the policy level had already put some computing power service providers on alert.
Jason recalled that since the first half of this year he had been cautious about GPU transshipment channels in Southeast Asia. When approached by channel providers claiming they could ship GPUs into China via Malaysia, his attitude was clear: first actually get the equipment in, then talk about cooperation.
Later, word gradually spread from Malaysia that GPU servers were being seized by customs, which made him even more certain of the risks of such transactions. In Jason's view, U.S. oversight of equipment transfers in third countries is tightening, and some transshipment channels that once seemed viable are now hard to rely on.
But even as cross-border transaction risks grow ever higher, some are still willing to take the gamble. "Nobody does a money-losing business, but there's always someone willing to do a 'beheading' business," one AI chip company executive commented.
Xiao Yu, who has been in the computing power services business for two years, did the math for Leiphone (official account: Leiphone): a B300 has a factory price of about 4 million yuan, while the actual overseas procurement cost reaches 7 to 8 million yuan. Once it is moved into China, the market quote immediately doubles.
Where does the huge price gap come from? First, the GPU ordering quota of overseas data centers itself has trading value.
Xiao Yu explained to Leiphone that when overseas data centers purchase high-performance GPUs, they usually need to submit information such as corporate background, data center conditions, and end use to upstream suppliers and wait for KYC (Know Your Customer) review.
Passing the review is only a precondition. Xiao Yu added that the number of GPUs a data center can order also depends on its own infrastructure conditions, such as power capacity.
On top of that, because the U.S. directly restricts exports of advanced GPUs to China and strictly investigates their flow, once supply enters gray channels, the high compliance risk is also converted into a premium.
Jason revealed that before the 黄仁勋 turmoil, the spot price of a single B300 in China had climbed to about 22 million yuan.
From the equipment itself to procurement channels and then to formal entry into the country, each layer of markup pushes up GPU market quotes while also costing buyers like Xiao Yu.
Previously, his team planned to purchase dozens of B300 units from overseas and even bought switches, network cards, and other supporting equipment in advance, but in the end the supplier delivered only two.
Xiao Yu believes the problem lies precisely in the cost of default being too low. As market quotes keep rising, even if a supplier abandons an existing order, the penalty it has to pay may be far lower than the profit it can earn by reselling the equipment.
Turning to Overseas Computing Power Sales: Stuck at the 12 Million Computing Power Red Line and Data Center Operations
Stuck at the 12 million computing power red line and data center operations
Faced with the growing difficulty of moving high-end GPU equipment across borders and rising default risks, Xiao Yu's team is now placing more emphasis on developing another business model—keeping GPUs in overseas data centers and serving local and domestic customers through computing power leasing, token billing, and other forms.
However, keeping GPUs overseas does not necessarily make computing power easy to sell.
Xiao Yu explained that local AI ecosystems and computing power demand in places such as Malaysia and Thailand are relatively limited, and the computing scale of some data centers already exceeds what the local market can absorb, which means domestic customers still dominate the demand market.
But this path is no easier than "moving equipment into China": the end customers and uses of overseas computing power services are likewise coming into the sight of U.S. regulators.
Foreign media previously reported that the U.S. planned to include seven countries—Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Norway, Brazil, and South Africa—in advanced AI chip export licensing management.
Recently, the final new rules published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) listed five countries, with Norway and South Africa not included.
In addition to the shrunken list, the new rules also set a scale threshold for remote computing power: if an overseas data center provides more than 12 million TPP (total processing performance) of computing power to enterprises whose headquarters or ultimate parent company headquarters are located in the restricted scope, the export, re-export, and in-country transfer of the relevant advanced chips all require a license.
The restricted scope currently covers EAR Group D:5 (including mainland China and Hong Kong) and Macau, China. However, even if the direct customer is not included in this scope, as long as the computing power ultimately flows to restricted enterprises, licensing requirements may still be triggered.
So how large is 12 million TPP in computing power terms? Estimated according to BIS's TPP calculation rules, it is roughly equivalent to about 95 8-card H200 SXM servers (FP8) or 27 8-card B300 servers (FP4).
Against the backdrop of machines for compliant uses becoming harder to obtain, keeping dozens or even hundreds of high-end servers running stably also makes the construction and operation of the data centers themselves difficult.
Xiao Yu gave an example: in the past, some container-style data centers were built in Southeast Asia in cooperation with domestic companies, and some projects mainly revolved around GPU reselling, with limited actual usability.
If such data centers want to continue operating, they need a stable power supply, professional operations and maintenance capabilities, and the ability to continuously provide computing power services externally in order to truly keep the machines running.
A Market Short on Cards, but Domestic GPUs May Not Get a Share
The U.S. tightening of 英伟达 high-end GPU supply to China theoretically opens up market space for domestic GPUs, but for now the optimistic expectations are mostly reflected in stock prices, while confidence on the industry side has not risen in tandem.
Whether domestic GPUs can capture market demand still depends on specific application scenarios.
The training side remains hard to crack. Multiple interviewees said that even if 英伟达 GPU prices rise due to supply constraints, big companies and model companies are still willing to pay a premium as long as the chips can support frontier model training.
By contrast, the inference market, which domestic GPUs are better positioned to win, may not add up economically.
One interviewee observed that starting with the H series, although 英伟达 graphics cards have higher unit prices, when calculated by final inference output, the unit cost may actually be lower than some cheaper domestic cards.
Industry analyst Qin Qing explained that the profit margin of the inference business depends heavily on the token selling price and the computing cost required to produce those tokens. If domestic cards cannot establish an advantage in HBM cost and computing efficiency, commercialization will still face pressure even if the per-card purchase price is lower.
According to Qin Qing's understanding, because domestic companies find it difficult to sign contracts directly with foreign original manufacturers, the procurement cost of some HBM in China is at least twice the normal overseas procurement price.
At the same time, domestic HBM supply is also waiting for new capacity to be released. But after research, Xiao Du believes that ChangXin's capacity may not become a new variable until next year at the earliest.
The pressure does not end there. Logic chip manufacturing and advanced packaging capacity are likewise plaguing domestic GPU manufacturers.
Xiao Du pointed out that chip design companies should in theory earn higher premiums based on architecture, software, and design capabilities, but before domestic chip manufacturers can turn these capabilities into market competitive advantages, they are already bottlenecked by manufacturing capacity and HBM supply, presenting a situation where "the supply chain premium is higher than the design capability."
The coordinated operation of the supply chain will remain a collective test that domestic GPU manufacturers cannot avoid in the coming year.
- Interviewees in this article are all anonymous.

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