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Do Machines Learn Deviance From Their Peers? A Randomized Test of Differential Association With AI Agents

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arXiv:2611.18098v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differential association theory and its extension, social learning theory, hold that rule-breaking, and the definitions that make it acceptable, are learned through interaction with others. Because people choose their friends, this claim has been hard to test. We addressed this selection problem with AI agents, which learn only through communication and can be assigned to peers at random. In a preregistered experiment, 420 teams of three agents (1,260 agents; seven AI models) worked on coding tasks that could not be solved honestly. A scripted teammate said that it had cheated (deviant peer), that it had reported the problem honestly (honest peer), or said nothing (silent peer). Half of the teams were told that an auditor read their chat. Compared with a silent peer, a deviant peer increased cheating (66.2% vs. 62.9%; OR = 1.96) and an honest peer reduced it (55.7%; OR = 0.35). Among agents that cheated, a deviant peer increased claims th…

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Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence

Title:Do Machines Learn Deviance From Their Peers? A Randomized Test of Differential Association With AI Agents

Abstract:Differential association theory and its extension, social learning theory, hold that rule-breaking, and the definitions that make it acceptable, are learned through interaction with others. Because people choose their friends, this claim has been hard to test. We addressed this selection problem with AI agents, which learn only through communication and can be assigned to peers at random. In a preregistered experiment, 420 teams of three agents (1,260 agents; seven AI models) worked on coding tasks that could not be solved honestly. A scripted teammate said that it had cheated (deviant peer), that it had reported the problem honestly (honest peer), or said nothing (silent peer). Half of the teams were told that an auditor read their chat. Compared with a silent peer, a deviant peer increased cheating (66.2% vs. 62.9%; OR = 1.96) and an honest peer reduced it (55.7%; OR = 0.35). Among agents that cheated, a deviant peer increased claims that cheating was normal (13.7% vs. 3.4%), often as the team's norm. Monitoring did not suppress prohibited discussion; it doubled it. Peers mattered only for models that had not yet decided. AI agents offer a new way to test criminological learning theories without selection effects.
Subjects:Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as:arXiv:2611.18098 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2611.18098v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.18098 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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