Computer Science > Machine Learning
Title:Adversarial Attacks on Downstream Weather Forecasting Models: Application to Tropical Cyclone Trajectory Prediction
Abstract:Deep learning-based weather forecasting (DLWF) models leverage past weather observations to generate future forecasts, supporting a wide range of downstream applications, including tropical cyclone (TC) prediction. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of these models to adversarial attacks, where subtle perturbations to upstream forecasts can alter downstream TC trajectory predictions. Crafting perturbed inputs to steer downstream outputs toward attacker-specified trajectories is a challenging problem for several reasons. First, conventional TC detection systems are opaque, non-differentiable black boxes, making standard gradient-based attacks infeasible. Second, the extreme rarity of TC events leads to a severe class imbalance problem, making it difficult to develop attack methods that produce realistic-looking cyclone paths aligned with target trajectories. To overcome these limitations, we propose Cyc-Attack, a novel method for perturbing the forecasts of DLWF models to generate adversarial trajectories. The proposed method uses a differentiable surrogate model to approximate the TC detector's output, enabling the application of gradient-based attacks. Cyc-Attack also employs a skewness-aware loss function with a kernel dilation strategy to address the severe class imbalance problem. Distance-based gradient weighting and regularization strategies are also introduced to constrain perturbations to eliminate unrealistic-looking TC paths. Our experiments show that Cyc-Attack achieves a higher true positive rate in matching the target trajectories, along with lower false alarm rates and stealthier perturbations than conventional attack methods. We further demonstrate that the adversarial upstream forecasts generated by Cyc-Attack can be leveraged as initial guidance to train an end-to-end model for learning adversarial input samples that would induce target trajectories.
| Comments: | Compared with the previous version, we (a) extend the downstream attack to an end-to-end attack; (b) further analyze physical feasibility and attack difficulty; and (c) develop a defense mechanism |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (stat.ML) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2510.10140 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2510.10140v3 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2510.10140 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
Submission history
Access Paper:
- HTML (experimental)
Additional Features
- Audio Summary
Current browse context:
References & Citations
- Google Scholar
- Semantic Scholar
BibTeX formatted citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article
Demos
Recommenders and Search Tools
arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.